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Abstract
Public opinion formation faces unprecedented challenges such as radicalization, echo cham-
bers, and opinion manipulations. Mathematical modeling plays a fundamental role in under-
standing how social influence shapes individuals’ opinions. Although most opinion dynamics
models assume that individuals update their opinions by averaging others’ opinions, we point
out that this taken-for-granted mechanism features a non-negligible unrealistic implication. By
resolving the shortcomings of weighted averaging in the framework of cognitive dissonance
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theory and network games, we derive a new micro-foundation of opinion dynamics, which hap-
pens to be the weighted-median mechanism. Empirical validation indicates that the weighted-
median mechanism significantly outperforms the weighted-averaging mechanism in predicting
individual opinion shifts. Compared with some widely-studied averaging-based models, the
weighted-median model, despite its simplicity in form, replicates more realistic features of
opinion dynamics, and exhibits richer phase-transition behavior depending on more delicate
and robust network structures. Our new model provides an untouched perspective on the study
of opinion formation processes and broadens the applicability of opinion dynamics models.
MAIN TEXT
INTRODUCTION
The key discourse in democratic society starts from exchanges of opinions in deliberative
groups, over public debates, or via social media, to eventually reaching agreements or disagree-
ments. Nowadays public opinion formation is deeply influenced by social networks and faces
unprecedented challenges such as opinion radicalization, echo chambers, and misinformation.
Mathematical modeling of opinion dynamics plays a fundamental role in gaining reliable un-
derstanding of how empirically observed macroscopic sociological phenomena emerge from
certain microscopic social-influence mechanisms and social network structures. Realistic, pre-
dictive, and quantitative models also help to answer some practically important questions, e.g.,
what drives some online social media users to join terrorism organizations, and how robust
is our society to political propaganda, fake news, or opinion manipulation? Interpersonal in-
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fluences are highly complicated processes involving various cognitive and socio-psychological
mechanisms. Therefore, the key challenge in building predictive and in the meanwhile mathe-
matically tractable quantitative models of opinion dynamics is to identify the “salient features”
that govern how individuals’ opinions are influenced by each other, i.e., the micro-foundation
of opinion dynamics.
Weighted-averaging opinion dynamics: DeGroot model and its extensions
Most existing deterministic opinion dynamics models originate from the classic DeGroot
model (1), in which individuals’ opinions on the issue being discussed are denoted by real
numbers and are updated by taking a weighted average opinions of those they are influenced by
(referred to as their social neighbors). The mathematical form of the DeGroot model is:
xi(t+ 1) = Meani(x(t);W ) =
n∑
j=1
wijxj(t), (1)
for any individual i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} in a group. Here xi(t) denotes individual i’s opinion at time
t, and wij is the weight individual i assigns to individual j’s opinion (wij ≥ 0 for any i, j and∑n
j=1wij = 1 for any i). The matrix W = (wij)n×n is referred to as the influence matrix and
defines a directed and weighted influence network, denoted by G(W ). In the influence network
G(W ), each node is an individual and eachwij > 0 corresponds to a directed link from i to their
social neighbor j with weight wij . See Fig. 1A as an example of the correspondence between
the influence matrix and the influence network.
Despite its mathematical elegance and widespread use, the DeGroot model (1) is limited
to opinions that are continuous by nature and leads to overly-simplified and unrealistic macro-
scopic predictions. For example, according to the DeGroot model, a group of individuals reach
consensus as long as the influence network is connected, i.e., as along as individuals can con-
nect with each other via some paths on the influence network. Arguably, this is a bold prediction
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under a very mild connectivity condition.
In real social systems, persistent disagreement is at least as prevalent as consensus. To
capture the phenomenon of persistent disagreement, various extensions have been proposed
by introducing additional model assumptions and parameters. These extensions are still based
on weighted averaging of real-valued opinions. Among them the most widely studied are the
DeGroot model with absolutely stubborn individuals (2), the bounded-confidence model with
interpersonal influences truncated according to opinion distances (3), and the Friedkin-Johnsen
model with individual prejudice, i.e., persistent attachments to initial conditions (4), see the
Supplementary Materials for a detailed review. In these models, the network topology, as
long as satisfying some mild connectivity conditions, barely plays a role in determining the
consensus-disagreement phase transition. Moreover, despite being sufficiently sophisticated in
terms of mathematics, none of these aforementioned models fully captures other prominent
features of opinion dynamics supported by the sociological literature and everyday experience,
such as the connection between social marginalization and opinion radicalization (5), diverse
public opinion distributions (6), and lower likelihoods of consensus in larger groups (7).
A widely overlooked unrealistic implication of weighted-averaging
The bottleneck in predictive power met by the aforementioned models inspires us to retro-
spect the very foundation of opinion dynamics. Here we point out that the weighted-averaging
mechanism itself, which the DeGroot model and all its extensions are based on, features a non-
negligibly unrealistic implication. This unrealistic implication is manifested by the following
example and is visually presented in Fig. 1B: Suppose an individual i’s opinion is influenced by
individuals j and k via the weighted-averaging mechanism, i.e.,
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + wik(xk(t)− xi(t)) + wij(xj(t)− xi(t)). (2)
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The equation above implies that whether individual i’s opinion moves towards xk(t) or xj(t)
is determined by whether wik|xk(t) − xi(t)| is larger than wij|xj(t) − xi(t)|. To illustrate this
unrealistic features, we appeal to an analogy between social interaction and physical forces, as
in the seminal works on “social forces” (8, 9). Note that, different from the physical forces,
the “attractive forces” of opinions directly apply to the change of opinions (analogous to “posi-
tions” in physics) rather than the second-order difference of opinions. The weighted-averaging
mechanism indicates that the “attractive force” of any opinion xj(t) to individual i is propor-
tional to the opinion distance |xj(t) − xi(t)|, or equivalently, the more distant an opinion, the
more attractive it is.
Since the weighted-averaging mechanism implies overly large “attractive forces” between
individuals holding different opinions, neither the individuals nor the influence network struc-
ture, as long as connected, is able to resist such huge attractions driving the system to consen-
sus. An immediate unrealistic consequence of the weighted-averaging mechanism is that social
groups have no resistance to opinion manipulation. For example, the DeGroot model predicts
that, if one individual’s opinion is manipulated, this individual alone can drive all the other
individuals’ opinions to arbitrarily extreme positions by moving their own opinion arbitrarily
far. See Fig. 1C for an example. Moreover, this unrealistic feature of the weighted-averaging
mechanism is inherited by all the extensions of the DeGroot model, though blended with other
effects introduced by these extensions.
RESULTS
Derivation and set-up of the weighted-median opinion dynamics
We resolve the unrealistic feature of the weighted-averaging mechanism and propose a new
micro-foundation of opinion dynamics in the framework of network games and the cognitive
dissonance theory. According to the seminal psychological theory (10) on cognitive dissonance
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and its experimental validations (11), individuals in a group experience cognitive dissonance
from disagreement and attempt to reduce such dissonance by changing their opinions. For any
individual i, such cognitive dissonance could be modelled as their cost function in a network
game, in which the individuals are the players and their strategies are the opinions they take.
For each individual i, the most parsimonious form of their cognitive dissonance, i.e., their cost
function, is written as
Ci(xi, x−i) =
n∑
j=1
wij|xi − xj|α, (3)
given individual i’s opinion xi and the other individuals’ current opinions, denoted by x−i.
Here α > 0 is a parameter. Individuals’ opinion updates could be in turn modelled as the best
responses to minimize their cost functions, i.e.,
xi(t+ 1) ∈ argminzCi(z, x−i(t)) = argminz
∑
j
wij|z − xj(t)|α, (4)
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For example, α = 2 for the DeGroot model (12). The parameter α has
a clear sociological interpretation: An exponent α > 1 (α < 1 resp.) implies that individuals
are more sensitive to distant (nearby resp.) opinions. In the absence of any widely-accepted
psychological theory in favor of α > 1 or α < 1, we adopt the neutral hypothesis α = 1.
We point out that, for generic weights, argminzCi(z, x−i(t)) with α = 1 is unique and the
best-response dynamics
xi(t+ 1) = argminz
n∑
j=1
wij|z − xj(t)| (5)
lead to the weighted-median opinion updates, i.e., xi(t+ 1) is the weighted-median of x(t) =
(x1(t), . . . , xn(t)) associated with the non-negative weights (wi1, . . . , win). The proof is pro-
vided in the Supplementary Materials. As will be manifested in the rest of this this article,
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this inconspicuous and subtle change in microscopic mechanism from weighted-averaging to
weighted-median leads to dramatic macroscopic consequences.
We formally define our novel weighted-median opinion dynamics as follows: Consider a
group of n individuals on an influence network G(W ) and denote by x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xn(t))
the individuals’ opinions at time t. Starting with an initial condition x(0) = (x1(0), . . . , xn(0)),
at each time step t+ 1 (t = 0, 1, 2, . . .), one individual i is randomly selected and updates their
opinion according to the following equation:
xi(t+ 1) = Medi(x(t);W ). (6)
Here Medi(x(t);W ) denotes the weighted median of the n-tuple x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xn(t))
associated with the weights (wi1, wi2, . . . , win). Such a weighted median is in turn defined as
Medi(x(t);W ) = x∗ ∈ {x1(t), . . . , xn(t)} satisfying
∑
j:xj(t)<x∗
wij ≤ 1
2
and
∑
j:xj(t)>x∗
wij ≤ 1
2
. (7)
For generic weights W = (wij)n×n, Medi(x(t);W ) is unique for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. If
the weighted medians of (x1(t), . . . , xn(t)) associated with the weights (wi1, . . . , win) are not
unique, we assume that Medi(x(t);W ) takes the value of the weighted median that is the closest
to xi(t). A more detailed discussion on the uniqueness of weighted medians is provided in the
Supplementary Materials.
Fig. 1D provides an example of the aforementioned cognitive dissonance function, with
α = 1, of an individual in an influence network, and how the weighted-median opinion is
computed given their social neighbors’ opinions. Intuitively, in our weighted-median model,
since the cognitive dissonances generated by distant opinions are much less than those in the
case of α > 1, the “attractive forces” by distant opinions in our model are not overly strong and
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thereby social groups may not always be driven to consensus, even when the influence networks
are connected. This intuitive speculation is confirmed later in the theoretical analysis section.
Since the attractions by distant opinions in our new model are weaker than in the DeGroot
model, the individual opinions in social groups are more resilient to opinion manipulation than
in the DeGroot model, see Fig. 1E for an example. As also indicated by Fig. 1E, the weighted-
median model is robust to outliers as well.
Besides the interpretations in the context of network games and cognitive dissonance theory,
the weighted-median mechanism is also grounded in the psychological theory of extremeness
aversion (13), according to which, people’s preferences are not always stable but can be al-
tered depending on what alternatives they are exposed to. Moreover, given multiple options
with certain ordering, people tend to choose the median option, which directly supports our
weighted-median mechanism.
Empirical validation of the weighted-median mechanism
Empirical validation on a longitudinal dataset (14) shows that the weighted-median mech-
anism enjoys significantly lower errors than the weighted-averaging mechanism in predicting
individual opinion shifts.
This dataset (14) is collected in a set of online human-subject experiments. Every single
experiment involves 6 anonymous individuals, who sequentially answer 30 questions within
tightly limited time. The questions are either guessing the proportion of a certain color in a
given image (gauging game), or guessing the number of dots in certain color in a given image
(counting game), see Fig. 2A for two examples. A common feature these two types of questions
share is that the answers are numerical by nature and based mainly on subjective guessing, given
limited time. For each question, the 6 participants give their answers for 3 rounds. After each
round, they will see the answers of all the 6 participants as feedback and possibly alter their
opinions based on this feedback. The dataset records, for each experiment, the individuals’
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opinions in each round of the 30 questions. See Fig. 2B as a sample of the dataset.
Our objective is to investigate whether the weighted-median mechanism is more accurate
than the weighted-averaging mechanism in predicting individuals’ opinion updates after being
confronted with the others’ opinions. Since in these experiments the individuals are anonymous,
it is reasonable to assume that the participants uniformly assign weights to each other when they
update their opinions. Therefore, what we aim to compare are the following two hypothesis:
(H1) Individuals update their opinions by taking the median of all the participants’ current
opinions; (H2) Individuals update their opinions by taking the average of all the participants’
current opinions. In addition, for Hypothesis (H1), if the medians are not unique, we assume
that the individuals take the median closest to their own current opinions.
Here we report the data analysis results regarding the individuals’ opinion shifts from the
2nd round to the 3rd round of each question. Results regarding the opinion shifts from the 1st
rounds to the 2nd rounds yield to quantitatively and qualitatively similar conclusions and are
provided in Supplementary Materials. For counting games, we randomly sample 18 experi-
ments from the dataset, in which 71 participants give answers to all the 30 questions at each
round. For each of these 71 participants, we apply Hypothesis (H1) and (H2) respectively to
predict their answers in the 3rd round of each question, based on the participants’ answers in
the 2nd round, and then compare the error rates of the predictions, defined as follows:
error rate =
|prediction− true value|
true value
. (8)
For the gauging games, we randomly sampled 21 experiments, in which 55 participants answer
all the 30 questions at each round. Since these answers are already in percentages, we di-
rectly compare the magnitudes of errors between the predictions by Hypothesis (H1) and (H2).
Fig. 2C presents the scatter plots between the predictions and the observed values (71×30=2130
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pairs of data points for the counting games and 55×30 = 1650 data pairs for the gauging games)
for both hypothesis. As Fig. 2D shows, regarding the counting games, the median error rate of
the predictions by median (H1) is 0.0714, which is a stunning 46.36% lower than that of the
predictions by average (H2). Regarding the gauging games, the median error of the predictions
by median is even 50% lower than the median error of the predictions by average. The predic-
tions by median also enjoy significantly lower mean error rate (MER) or mean absolute-value
error (MAE) than the predictions by average, in both counting games and gauging games.
In addition, we also consider some meaningful extensions of the weighted-median and
weighted-average mechanisms by introducing individual inertia or attachments to initial opin-
ions (4). The data analysis results are reported in the Supplementary Materials. For any of
these set-ups, the model based on median is more accurate than the model based on averaging
in predicting participants’ opinion shifts. Moreover, these extensions to the weighted-median
mechanism achieve remarkably low prediction errors by introducing additional individual pa-
rameters. However, despite being useful for fitting the models, these parameters do not reflect
intrinsic attributes of the individuals, nor are they stable over time. Hence, we will refrain from
such extensions and focus on the core issue, namely the mean v.s. the median mechanisms.
Comparative numerical studies and sociological relevance
Comparative numerical studies indicate that the weighted-median opinion dynamics repli-
cate various non-trivial realistic features of opinion dynamics whereas the DeGroot model
and its extensions fail to. The models in comparison include the DeGroot model with abso-
lutely stubborn individuals, the Friedkin-Johnsen model, and the networked bounded confidence
model, all with randomized model parameters.
Social marginalization and opinion radicalization: Extreme ideologies such as terrorism
are among the most serious challenges our modern society faces. Previous sociological studies,
via empirical, conceptual, and case studies (5, 15, 16), identify social marginalization as an
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important cause of opinion radicalization. However, such a connection has barely been captured
by quantitative models of opinion dynamics.
Among all the opinion dynamics models compared in this section, our weighted-median
model is the only one showing that extreme opinions tend to reside in peripheral areas of social
networks. Fig. 3A provides a visualized illustration of this feature. As the quantitative compar-
isons presented in Fig. 3D indicate, among all the models in comparison, only our weighted-
median model exhibits the feature that the in-degree centrality distributions of opinions with
different levels of extremeness are clearly separated, and the empirical probability density of
the most extreme opinions decays the fastest as the in-degree increases. Simulations regard-
ing other notions of centralities, e.g., closeness centrality and betweenness centrality, lead to
qualitatively the same result and are presented in Supplementary Materials. To avoid the risk
of bias due to the higher probability of being absolutely stubborn (self-weight > 1/2) in the
weighted-median model when the in-degree is small, we have performed a second experiment
on graphs without self-weight, and obtained similar results, see the Supplementary Materials.
Further simulation results on the weighted-median model indicate a mechanistic explanation
for the cause of opinion radicalization. We simulate the weighted-median opinion dynamics on
a scale-free network with 2000 nodes for 1000 times and record the individuals’ extremist fo-
cuses, i.e., the ratio of their social neighbors holding extreme opinions, at final steady states. As
shown in Fig. 3B, compared to the entire population, the extreme opinion holders tend to have
low in-degrees but relatively high extremist focus. This result implies that radicalized individ-
uals form small-size clusters. Such clustered micro-structures are believed to develop powerful
cohesion and are characteristic of terrorists cells (5). According to the weighted-median opin-
ion dynamics, individuals inside such radicalized small clusters stick to extreme opinions be-
cause the extreme opinions constitute their main information sources, i.e., the weighted-median
opinions. This explanation is supported by previous sociological literature, e.g. see the case
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analysis (16) and the empirical study (15). These two studies lead to a common conclusion that
socially marginalized individuals could adopt extreme opinions by yielding to social influence
if extreme opinions are dominant among their social contacts. On the other hand, radicalization
is less likely for individuals with more social relations, which implies potentially more diverse
information.
Remarkably, the in-degree-extremist-focus distribution for the extremists presented in
Fig. 3B resembles the empirical data on the in-degree-ISIS-focus distributions of randomly
sampled Twitter users, see Fig. 5 of the paper by Benigni et al. (17), cited as Fig. 3C in this
paper. Other models in comparison do not capture this feature, see the Supplementary Materials.
Empirically observed steady public opinion distributions: Empirical evidences suggest
that public opinions usually form into certain steady distributions. One particular interesting
opinion distribution is the multi-modal distribution, which is frequently observed in real data,
e.g., see the Supplementary Materials for the longitudinal survey on Europeans’ attitude towards
the effect of immigration on local culture (Data obtained from the European Social Survey web-
site: http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/). Multi-modal opinion distributions constitute the
premise of multi-party political systems (6) and sociologists have long been interested in what
mathematical assumptions are needed to model the formation of steady multi-modal opinion
distributions along opinion dynamics (18, 19). Our weighted-median opinion dynamics offer
perhaps the simplest answer to this open problem. As shown in Fig. 4, the weighted-median
model naturally generate various types of non-trivial steady opinion distributions that are fre-
quently observed empirically (6, 20), while the other models, without deliberately tuning their
parameters, only predict some of them.
Vanishing likelihood of reaching consensus in large and clustered networks: One could
easily conclude from everyday experience that it is usually more difficult for groups with larger
sizes to reach consensus, see also the empirical evidence (7). However, most of the previ-
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ous opinion dynamics models do not capture this obvious feature. As Fig. 5A and 5B indi-
cates, among all the models in comparison, only the weighted-median model and the networked
bounded-confidence model reflect the realistic feature that larger groups have lower likelihoods
of reaching consensus. Moreover, as shown by Fig. 5C, with fixed network sizes and link den-
sities, our weighted-median model predicts that the likelihoods of reaching consensus increase
as the networks become less clustered. Such a feature is not clearly reflected by the network
bounded-confidence model, see Fig. 5D. For the other opinion dynamics based on weighted-
averaging, network features such as size and clustering coefficient play no role in determining
the probability of reaching consensus. Instead, these models predict either almost-sure consen-
sus or almost-sure disagreement, as shown in Fig. 5B.
Analytical results: convergence and phase transition
Theoretical analysis of the weighted-median opinion dynamics indicates that, despite its
simplicity in form, the weighted-median model exhibits richer dynamical behavior that depends
on more delicate and robust influence network structures, compared with previous models based
on weighted-averaging. In this section, we mathematically establish the set of equilibria, the
almost-sure finite-time convergence to an equilibrium, and the phase-transition behavior be-
tween eventual consensus and persistent disagreement. The salient features responsible for the
numerical observations in last section, as well as our key analysis tools, are the notions of
cohesive sets and decisive links described below.
Cohesive sets and decisive links: The definition of cohesive sets is given in previous
literature on contagion processes (21) and applied in the linear-threshold network diffusion
model (22). To put it simply, a cohesive set is a subset of individuals on the influence network,
of which each individual assigns more weights to the insiders than the outsiders. Intuitively,
according to the weighted-median mechanism, if all the individuals in a cohesive set hold the
same opinion, they will never change their opinions. A maximal cohesive set is a cohesive set
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of individuals such that adding any single outsider to this set makes it non-cohesive. The formal
definitions of cohesive sets and maximally cohesive sets are given as follows: Given an influ-
ence network G(W ) with nodes set V = {1, . . . , n}, a cohesive set M ⊂ V is a subset of nodes
that satisfies
∑
j∈M wij ≥ 1/2 for any i ∈ M . A cohesive set M is a maximal cohesive set if
there does not exists i ∈ V \M such that ∑j∈M wij > 1/2. A visualized example of (maximal)
cohesive set is provided in Fig. 6A. Cohesive sets are intricately related to the weighted median
dynamics, and their salient properties are derived in the Supplementary Materials.
Cohesive set as defined above can be interpreted as a characterization of the so-called echo-
chambers. In news media, echo chamber is a metaphorical description of a situation in which
beliefs are amplified or reinforced by communication and repetition inside a closed system.
According to the weighted-median mechanism, whenever all the individuals in a cohesive set
adopt the same opinion, this cohesive set becomes an echo chamber in the sense that the individ-
uals in this cohesive set will never change their opinion. If an influence network have multiple
cohesive sets, these cohesive sets might prevent the system from converging to consensus.
The concepts of decisive/indecisive links are novel. A link from i to j in the influence
network G(W ) is indecisive if there is no circumstances under which the opinion of j makes
any difference to the update opinion of i, and is decisive otherwise. Their formal definitions
are given as follows: Given an influence network G(W ) with the node set V , define the out-
neighbor set of each node i as Ni = {j ∈ V |wij 6= 0}. A link (i, j) is a decisive out-link of
node i, if there exists a subset θ ⊂ Ni such that the following three conditions hold: (1) j ∈ θ;
(2)
∑
k∈θ wik ≥ 1/2; (3)
∑
k∈θ\{j}wik < 1/2. Otherwise, the link (i, j) is an indecisive out-link
of node i. Visualized examples of decisive and indecisive links are provided in Fig. 6B.
Set of equilibrium: Recall that our weighted-median opinion dynamics are derived from
a network game, where the individuals are the players with the opinions they take as their
strategies and, for each individual i, the cost function is their cognitive dissonance, given by
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Ci(xi, x−i) =
∑n
j=1wij|xi − xj|. Here x−i denotes all the other individuals’ opinions. Here
we establish that the equilibria of the weighted-median opinion dynamics are equivalent to the
Nash equilibria of this network game. Moreover, we show that the possible configurations of
these equilibria are determined by the cohesive sets in the influence network. Consider the
weighted-median opinion dynamics on an influence network G(W ) with n individuals and let
Rn be the set of all the n-dimensional vectors of real numbers. An opinion vector x∗ ∈ Rn
is an equilibrium of the weighted-median opinion dynamics if x∗i = Medi(x
∗;W ) for any i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, i.e., no individual can change their opinion via the weighted-median mechanism.
For the corresponding network game, x∗ is a Nash equilibrium if, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the
inequality Ci(x∗i , x
∗
−i) ≤ Ci(xi, x∗−i) holds for any xi ∈ R. Given any generic influence matrix
W , the following statements are equivalent:
1. x∗ ∈ Rn is an equilibrium of the weighted-median opinion dynamics;
2. x∗ is an Nash equilibrium of the corresponding network game;
3. x∗ is either a consensus state, i.e., x∗i = x
∗
j for any i and j, or satisfy the following condi-
tion: for any y with mini x∗i < y < maxi x
∗
i , both the node set {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} |x∗i ≥ y}
and the node set {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} |x∗i < y} are maximal cohesive sets on the influence
network G(W ).
The proof is provided in the Supplementary Materials. Statement 3 explicitly characterizes
how the influence network structure confines the possible configurations of the equilibria of the
weighted-median opinion dynamics. Apparently, any consensus state x∗ is an equilibrium; For
any x∗ that is not a consensus states, in order for x∗ to be an equilibrium of the weighted-median
opinion dynamics, it must satisfy the following constraint: Whenever we partition the node set
ofG(W ) into two disjoint “factions” V1 and V2 such that the opinion x∗i of any individual i ∈ V1
is smaller than the opinion xj of any individual j ∈ V2, the sets V1 and V2 must both be maximal
15
cohesive sets.
Convergence and consensus-disagreement phase transition: Given the influence net-
work G(W ), denote by Gdecisive(W ) the influence network with all the indecisive out-links
in G(W ) removed. In addition, we say a node on a given network is globally reachable if any
other node on this network has at least one directed path connecting to this node. The main
analytical results on the dynamical behavior of the weighted-median model are summarized as
follows: Consider the weighted-median opinion dynamics on an influence network G(W ) with
the node set V = {1, . . . , n}. The following statements hold:
1. For any initial condition x0 ∈ Rn, the solution x(t) almost surely converges to a steady
state x∗ in finite time;
2. If the only maximal cohesive set of G(W ) is V itself, then, for any initial condition
x0 ∈ Rn, the solution x(t) almost surely converges to a consensus state;
3. If G(W ) has a maximal cohesive set M 6= V , then there exists a subset of initial con-
ditions X0 ⊂ Rn, with non-zero measure in Rn, such that for any x0 ∈ X0 there is no
update sequence along which the solution converges to consensus; and
4. If Gdecisive(W ) does not have a globally reachable node, then, for any initial condition
x0 ∈ Rn, the solution x(t) almost surely reaches a disagreement steady state in finite
time.
The weighted-median model exhibits more sophisticated phase-transition behavior between
asymptotic consensus and persistent disagreement, while many averaging-based models, e.g.,
the DeGroot model, the DeGroot model with absolutely stubborn individuals, and the Friedkin-
Johnsen model, predict either almost-sure consensus or almost-sure disagreement. Moreover,
different from the DeGroot model, in which the consensus-disagreement phase transition is
determined only by the network connectivity, in the weighted-median model, such a phase
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transition depends on the initial condition as well as a more delicate network structure, i.e.,
the non-trivial maximal cohesive sets. Compared to network connectivity, the non-existence of
non-trivial maximal cohesive set implies a more strict and thereby more realistic condition for
almost-sure consensus.
Compared with the DeGroot model, our weighted-median model enjoys higher robustness
to structural changes, i.e., perturbations of influence networks coming from random noises or
model imprecision. For the DeGroot model, one infinitesimal perturbation, e.g. adding one
social link with very small weight, could completely change the connectivity property of the
influence network and thus the prediction about consensus or disagreement. In the weighted-
median model, in generic cases, adding one link with very small weight has no effect on the
system’s dynamical behavior, since very likely the added link will be an indecisive link. See
Fig. 6C and 6D for an example showing the resilience of the weighted-median model and De-
Groot model to network perturbation.
DISCUSSION
Occam’s razor in opinion dynamics: The weighted-median opinion dynamics model (6)
is a splendid application of the principle of the Occam’s razor in social science (One way to
state the principle of Occam’s razor is that “Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily.”)
In terms of microscopic mechanism, the weighted-median model is as simple as the classic
DeGroot model. Despite its simplicity in form, the weighted-median model replicates various
realistic features of opinion dynamics, which DeGroot model and its widely studied more com-
plex extensions fail to fully capture, such as vulnerability of socially marginalized individuals
to opinion radicalization, the formation of various steady public opinion distributions, and the
effects of group size and clustering on the likelihood of reaching consensus.
The physical intuition behind these advantages is that the weighted-median model is built
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on a more realistic micro-foundation. For opinion dynamics based on weighted-averaging opin-
ion updates, in order to resist the overly large attractions by distant opinions, which force the
individuals to reach consensus, additional assumptions have to be introduced. These additional
assumptions are either individual-level dynamics, such as individual stubbornness and persis-
tent attachment to initial conditions, which are irrelevant to any network structure, or discon-
tinuous sudden truncations of the attractions by distant opinions, e.g., the bounded-confidence
model, which are somehow artificial and barely mathematically tractable. Despite these addi-
tional assumptions being added, the roles of the influence network structure in these models
are still not well captured. Different from these widely-studied models, our weighted-median
opinion dynamics resolve the problem of overly large attractions by distant opinions. As the
consequences, some non-trivial opinion distributions, e.g., the bimodal and multi-modal distri-
butions, can present as steady distributions, and the effects of some delicate network structures
on the model’s dynamical behavior naturally emerge, e.g., the cohesive sets and decisive links
extensively studied in this paper.
Broader applicability and fundamental advantage in the representation of opinions:
Our new model broadens the applicability of opinion dynamics to the scenarios of ordered
multiple-choice issues. The weighted median operation is well-defined as long as opinions
are ranked and the weighted median opinions are always chosen among the opinions of the
individuals’ social neighbors. Therefore, the opinion evolution is discrete and the “ordered
multiple choices” are preserved. Debates and decisions about ordered multiple-choice issues
are prevalent in reality. For example, in modern societies, many political issues are evaluated
along one-dimension ideology spectra and political solutions often do not lend themselves to
a continuum of viable choices. At a fundamental level, our weighted-median model has an
advantage that it is independent of numerical representations of opinions. Such representations
may be non-unique and artificial for any issue where the opinions are not intrinsically quan-
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titative. Obviously, a nonlinear opinion rescaling leads to major changes in the evolution of
the averaging-based opinion dynamics. It is notable that the human mind often perceives and
manipulates quantities in a nonlinear fashion, e.g., the perception of probability according to
prospect theory (23).
Influence networks with state-dependent weights: In the classic DeGroot model and its
widely-studied extensions, link weights in influence networks are usually assumed to be fixed
and independent of the opinion evolution. With fixed weights, the weighted-averaging mech-
anism leads to the implication that attractiveness of opinions are proportional to opinion dis-
tances. One natural way to resolve this unrealistic feature is considering weighted-averaging
models with state-dependent weights, e.g., weights that somehow decrease with the opinion
distance. In terms of sociological interpretation, fixed weights wij may describe a stable social
structure among individuals and be therefore exogenous to the opinion formation process, while
state-dependent weights may be formed upon listening to the arguments of the individuals and
be therefore endogenous. The cognitive mechanisms leading to the establishment of endoge-
nous weights are wide-ranging, complex, and in general hard to model, e.g., see the paper (24).
As shown by theoretical analysis in last section, our weighted-median model exhibits a robust-
ness to the network weights. Thus, it is less sensitive to state-dependent or uncertain graphs. In
addition, the weighted-median model itself can be interpreted as a special weighted-averaging
mechanism, in which the weights are highly non-linear functions of individuals’ current states.
That is, at any time, each individual assign all their weights to the social neighbor that currently
sits right in the weighted-median position and assign zero weight to any other social neighbor’s
opinion.
A new line of research inspired by the weighted-median model: The weighted-median
opinion dynamics proposed in this paper could inspire the readers to rethink the microfounda-
tion of opinion dynamics and open up a new line of research on the mathematical modeling of
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opinion formation processes. All the previous meaningful extensions of the classic DeGroot,
e.g., persistent attachments to initial opinions, time-varying graphs, and antagonistic relations,
can be introduced to the weighted-median model to further improve its predictive power and
enrich its dynamical behavior. In addition, since the weighted-median mechanism with iner-
tia exhibits remarkably high accuracy in quantitatively predicting individual opinion shifts, it
would be of great research value to study the properties and efficient estimations of individ-
ual inertia, as well as the dynamical behavior of the weighted-median opinion dynamics with
inertia.
METHODS
Simulation setups
In this subsection, we provide the simulation setups for the numerical results presented in
Fig. 3-5. In these numerical results, we compare in various aspects the predictions by our
weighted-median model with those by some other widely-studied opinion dynamics models.
Models in comparison: We mainly compare our weighted median models with the follow-
ing models: the DeGroot model with absolutely stubborn agents; the Friedkin-Johnsen model,
and the networked bounded-confidence model.
The DeGroot model with absolutely stubborn individual (2) is given by the following equa-
tion:
xi(t+ 1) =
n∑
j=1
wijxj(t), for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, (9)
where there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that wii = 1, indicating that individual i is absolutely
stubborn. Since the assumption of absolute stubbornness is often too strong and there is no
widely-accepted statistical result on the proportion of “absolutely stubborn individuals” in real
society, we assume that the social system we consider has 5% absolutely stubborn individuals.
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In our setup, given an influence networkG(W ) originally with no absolutely stubborn individu-
als, each individual has a 5% probability of being absolutely stubborn, i.e., for each individuals
i, with probability 5%, the i-th row of W will be changed to wii = 1 and wij = 0 for any j 6= i.
The equation for Friedkin-Johnsen model (4) is given by
x(t+ 1) = AWx(t) + (I − A)x(0), (10)
whereA = diag(a1, . . . , an) is a diagonal matrix with non-negative diagonal entries and each ai
characterizes individual i’s attachment to their initial opinion xi(0). Except for the constraints
that ai ∈ [0, 1] for any i, the Friedkin-Johnsen model itself does not specify what the values of
a1, . . . , an should be. Here we assume that each ai is independently randomly generated from
the uniform distribution Unif[0, 1].
The widely-studied bounded-confidence model is only for all-to-all networks (25) and thus
not comparable to the weighted-median model. The bounded-confidence model built on ar-
bitrary networks, which is included here for comparison, has barely been rigorously analyzed
in previous literature, due to its mathematical intractability and fragile convergence proper-
ties (26). Given the influence network G(W ), the networked bounded-confidence model is
given below:
xi(t+ 1) =
∑
j∈Ni: |xj(t)−xi(t)|<ri wijxj(t)∑
j∈Ni: |xj(t)−xi(t)|<ri wij
, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (11)
where ri is referred to as individual i’s confidence radius and characterizes individual i’s open-
mindedness. Here we assume that, if the initial opinions are in the interval [0, 1], then the
individual confidence radii are independently randomly generated from the uniform distribution
on [0, 0.5]; if the initial opinions are in the interval [−1, 1], then the individual confidence radii
are independently randomly generated from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. As a result, the
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most closed-minded individuals are absolutely stubborn and the most open-minded individuals
are open to any opinion.
Construction of random graphs: In this paper we simulate different opinion dynamics
models on randomly generated scale-free networks or small-world networks. Given the num-
ber of nodes, we randomly generate the scale-free networks according to the Baraba´si-Albert
model (27) with average individual degree equal to 4, i.e., for each new node added to the graph,
2 bilateral links are built between the new node and two existing nodes in the graph according
to the preferential attachment algorithm (27). Self loops are also added to each node. We then
assign each directed link a weight independently randomly generated from the uniform distribu-
tion on [0, 1] and normalize the weights such that, for each individual, the sum of their out-links’
weights (including the self loop’s weight) is equal to 1. Suppose a scale-free network with n
nodes is constructed in this way and denote by W = (wij)n×n its associated adjacency matrix.
We have wij ≥ 0 for any i, j and ∑nj=1wij = 1 for any i, which is consistent with the setups of
all the opinion dynamics models simulated in this paper.
We randomly generate small-world networks according to the Watts-Strogatz model (28).
This generative model has three parameters: the network size n, the average individual degree
d (an even number), and the rewiring probability β of individuals’ out-links. Self loops are
added to each node and the actual average individual degree is thereby d + 1. We assign and
normalize the weights of the links in the same way as for the scale-free networks mentioned in
last paragraph.
Social marginalization and opinion radicalization: In Fig. 3 we compare different mod-
els’ predictions on the spatial distribution of extreme opinions in the influence networks. We
simulate different models on the same randomly generated influence networks with the same
randomly generated initial opinions, and then collect the data of the final steady states pre-
dicted by these models. In each simulation, the individuals’ initial opinions are independently
22
randomly generated from the uniform distribution on [−1, 1] and opinions are classified into
4 categories. The moderate opinions correspond to those in the interval [−0.25, 0.25]; the
biased opinions correspond to those in [−0.5,−0.25) ∪ (0.25, 0.5]; the radical opinions cor-
respond to those in [−0.75,−0.5) ∪ (0.5, 0.75]; the extreme opinions correspond to those in
[−1,−0.75) ∪ (0.75, 1].
For the simulation result presented in Fig. 3A, we simulate for 1000 times the weighted-
median opinion dynamics on the same scale-free network with 1500 nodes. Each simulation
starts with a different randomly generated initial condition. For each individual, we compute
the frequency of finally adopting an extreme opinion over the 1000 independent simulations.
For the simulation results presented in Fig. 3B, we construct a scale-free network with 2000
nodes and run 1000 simulations of the weighted-median opinion dynamics with independently
randomly generated initial opinions. For the final steady state in each simulation, we compute
the extremists focus, defined as the ratio of neighors adopting extreme opinions, and the indegree
centrality for each individual. Then we plot the 2-dimension distributions over the extremists
focus and the indegree for the extremists and the entire population respectively.
For the simulation results presented in Fig. 3D, we simulate each opinion dynamics models
in comparison for 500 times. In each simulation, a scale-free network with 1000 nodes is ran-
domly generated and different models are simulated starting with the same randomly generated
initial opinions. We obtain the final steady states predicted by each model, based on which we
estimate, for each model, the probability density functions of individual in-degree centrality for
individuals holding moderate, biased, radical, and extreme final opinions separately. Here the
in-degree centrality is defined as the sum of the weights of all the incoming links, including the
self loop.
Empirically observed steady public opinion distributions: In Fig. 4, we compare dif-
ferent models’ predictions of the final opinion distributions given various initial opinion dis-
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tributions. We simulate different opinion dynamics models on the same randomly generated
scale-free network with 5000 nodes. We consider three different initial distributions: a uniform
distribution, a bimodal distribution, and a 3-modal distribution, defined as follows respectively:
1. Regarding the uniform distribution, we let the initial opinion of each individual be in-
dependently randomly sampled from the uniform distribution on [0, 1], i..e, xi(0) ∼
Unif[0, 1] for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n};
2. Regarding the bimodal distribution, each individual i’s initial opinion is independently
generated in the following way: Firstly we generate a random sample Y from the Beta
distribution Beta(2, 10), and then let xi(0) = Y or 1−Y with probability 0.5 respectively;
3. Regarding the 3-modal distribution, each individual i’s initial opinion is independently
generated in the following way: Firstly we generate two random samples Y and Z from
Beta(2, 17) and Beta(12, 12) respectively, and then let xi(0) be Y , 1 − Y , or Z with
probabilities 0.33, 0.33, and 0.34 respectively.
For each initial opinion distribution, we randomly generate the initial opinion of each individ-
ual independently and let the models in comparison start with the same initial condition. When
each of these models reaches a steady state, their final opinion distributions are computed re-
spectively.
Vanishing likelihood of reaching consensus in large and clustered networks: In Fig. 5,
we compare different models’ predictions on the likelihood of reaching consensus in influence
networks with different sizes and different clustering coefficients. The simulations are con-
structed on randomly generated Watts-Strogatz small-world networks, in which the rewiring
probability β ∈ [0, 1] determines the clustering coefficient of the graph. The smaller β, the
more clustered the network is. When we investigate the effect of group size, we fix the aver-
age individual degree and the rewiring probability β so that the network size changes without
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significantly changing the local structure of the network; When we investigate the effect of
clustering, we fix the number of nodes n and the average individual degree, while changing the
parameter β ∈ [0, 1]. For the simulation results presented in Fig. 5A and B, we fix the rewiring
probability as β = 1 and randomly generate small-world networks with different sizes and aver-
age degrees. For each pair of network size and average degree, we construct 5000 simulations.
In each simulation, different models start with the same initial condition that is independently
randomly generated from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. For each model we compute the
frequency of finally achieving consensus over the 5000 simulations. For the results presented
in Fig. 5C and D, we fix the network size as n = 30, and construct small-world networks with
different rewiring probabilities β and average degrees, as shown in the figures. For each pair of
β and average degree, we construct 5000 simulations of the weighted-median opinion dynam-
ics (Fig. 5C) and the networked bounded-confidence model (Fig. 5D). Each simulation starts
with a different initial condition randomly sampled from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. For
each parameter setup, we compute the frequency of finally achieving consensus over the 5000
simulations.
Important methods and concepts for theoretical analysis
Regarding the theoretical analysis of the weighted-median opinion dynamics, we mainly
focus on the characterization of the equilibrium set, the establishment of almost-sure conver-
gence of individual opinions, and the investigation of the phase transition between consensus
and persistent disagreement. The technical details are provided in the Supplementary Materials.
Here we highlight some important mathematical tools and concepts.
“Monkey-typewriter argument”: A key method adopted in proving the convergence of the
weighted-median opinion dynamics is the so-called “monkey-typewriter argument”. That is, to
put it in a vivid way, a monkey hitting keys at random on a typewriter keyboard for an infinite
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amount of time will almost surely type any given text, such as the complete works of William
Shakespeare. This method transforms the analysis of dynamical processes with uncertainty to
control design problems (29). In our weighted-median model, the uncertainty comes from the
randomly generated initial opinions and the random update orders, i.e., which individual update
their opinion at which time step. The basic idea of this “monkey-typewriter argument” is that,
the almost-sure convergence is guaranteed if, at any initial state, we can manually construct an
update sequence along which the individuals’ opinions reach an equilibrium. Such a method
is formally presented as the following lemma and the proof is provided in the Supplementary
Materials.
Lemma 1 (From uncertainty to control design) For the weighted-median opinion dynamics
with n individuals defined in the Results section, if, for any n-dimension individual opinions
vector x, there exists an update sequence i1, . . . , iTx such that the individual opinions starting
from x reaches an equilibrium at time Tx by updating individual it’s opinion st each time step t
(t = 1, 2, . . . , Tx), then, for any initial condition, the individuals’ opinions almost surely reach
an equilibrium in finite time.
Based on this “monkey-typewriter argument”, when we prove the almost-sure convergence
of the weighted-median opinion dynamics, we first discuss the construction of update sequences
when there exist only two different opinions in the network, and then extend the analysis to the
general case with generic initial opinions. The detailed proof is provided in the Supplementary
Materials.
Cohesive set and its properties: Cohesive set is an important network structure that influences
the behavior of the weighted-median opinion dynamics. The concept of cohesive set was first
proposed in (21) in a more general sense. In our weighted-median model, cohesive sets are
defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Cohesive sets and maximal cohesive sets) Given an influence network G(W )
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with node set V , a cohesive set M ⊆ V is a subset of nodes that satisfies ∑j∈M wij ≥ 1/2 for
any i ∈M . A cohesive set M is a maximal cohesive set if there does not exists i ∈ V \M such
that
∑
j∈M wij > 1/2.
We further define the cohesive expansion for any subset of nodes in the influence network.
Definition 2 (Cohesive expansion) Given an influence networkG(W ) with node set V and a
subset of nodes M ⊆ V , the cohesive expansion of M , denoted by Expansion(M), is the subset
of V constructed via the following iteration algorithm:
1. Let M0 = M ;
2. For k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., if there exists i ∈ V \ Mk such that ∑j∈Mk wij > 1/2, then let
Mk+1 = Mk ∪ {i};
3. Terminate the iteration at step k as long as there does not exists any i ∈ V \Mk such that∑
j∈Mk wij > 1/2, and let Expansion(V˜ ) = Mk.
The following lemma presents some important properties of cohesive expansions and the
proof is provided in the Supplementary Materials.
Lemma 3.2 (Properties of cohesive expansion) Given an influence networkG(W ) with node
set V , the following statements hold:
1. For any M ⊆ V , the cohesive expansion of M is unique, i.e., independent of the order of
node additions;
2. For any M, M˜ ⊆ V , if M ⊆ M˜ , then Expansion(M) ⊆ Expansion(M˜);
3. For any M, M˜ ⊆ V , Expansion(M) ∪ Expansion(M˜) ⊆ Expansion(M ∪ M˜); and
4. If M is a cohesive set, then Expansion(M) is also cohesive and is the smallest maximal
cohesive set that contains M , that is, for any maximal cohesive set Mˆ such that M ⊆ Mˆ ,
we have Expansion(M) ⊆ Mˆ .
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H2: Supplementary Materials
The Supplementary Materials include the following contents:
Supplementary texts;
Fig. S1. Longitudinal data of the distribution of European peoples attitudes, in the years of
2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016, towards the following statement:“Countrys cultural life is under-
mined by immigrants”.
Fig. S2. Examples of cohesive sets and decisive/indecisive links in influence networks.
Fig. S3. Empirical analysis results for the dataset collected in an online human-subject
experiment.
Fig. S4. Distributions of the initial opinions and the final opinions predicted by different
models on scale-free networks.
Fig. S5. Distributions of the initial opinions and the final opinions predicted by different
models on small-world networks.
Fig. S6. Comparisons among the weighted-median model, the Friedkin-Johnsen model, and
the DeGroot model with absolutely stubborn agents, on their predictions of the two-dimension
distributions of the final opinions, over the extremists focus and the indegree centrality.
Fig. S7. Centrality distributions for moderate, biased, radical and extreme final opinions
predicted by different models on scale-free networks.
Fig. S8. Centrality distributions for moderate, biased, radical and extreme final opinions
predicted by the weighted-median model, on a scale-free network with no self loop.
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Fig. 1: Micro-foundations and implications of the weighted-averaging and the weighted-
median mechanisms. Panel A is an example of a 4× 4 influence matrix and the corresponding
influence network with 4 nodes. Pandel B illustrates the unrealistic implication of the weighted-
averaging opinion update: The “attractive forces” of opinions xk(t) and xj(t) are proportional
to their distances from xi(t) respectively. Panel C shows the behavior of the DeGroot model
under opinion manipulation, with the influence network given in Panel A. Here individuals 1 to
3 follow the weighted-averaging mechanism, while individual 4’s opinion is externally manip-
ulated. As shown in the plot, individual 1 to 3’s opinions can be driven to arbitrary positions
by individual 4. Panel D plots the cognitive dissonance function for node 1 in the influence
network shown in Panel A, following the weighted-median mechanism. Node 1 computes the
weighted-median opinion by first sorting its social neighbors’ opinions and picking the one such
that the cumulative weights assigned to the opinions on its both sides are less than 0.5. Pandel E
shows the behavior of the weighted-median model under opinion manipulation. The influence
network and the initial condition are the same as in Panel C. Individual 1-3 here follow the
weighted-median mechanims instead and individual 4’s opinion is manipulated. As shown in
the plot, when individual 4’s opinion jumps from 7 to 10, the other individuals do not follow
this change.
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Fig. 2: Comparison between the weighted-median and the weighted-averaging mecha-
nisms via empirical data analysis of a set of online experiments (14). In each experiment,
6 anonymous participants answer 30 questions sequentially. Each question is answered for
3 rounds. Panel A shows one example for each type of questions asked in the experiments.
Panel A is copied from Fig. H in the Supplementary Materials of the original paper (14), li-
censed under Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0). Panel B is a sample data of 6
partipants’ answers to the first two questions in an experiment. Panel C are the scatter plots
between the participants’ observed answers at the 3rd rounds and the predictions by median
and average respectively. Panel D presents the corresponding prediction errors/error rates, their
95% confidence intervals computed by the binomial distribution method (30), and mean error
rate (MAE) or mean absolute-value error (MAE). We compute MAE for the gauging games
because the answers to gauging games are already in percentages.
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Fig. 3: Simulation results on the relations between opinion extremeness and in-degree
centrality (defined as the sum of incoming link weights). In each simulation, the ini-
tial opinions are independently randomly generated from the uniform distribution on [−1, 1]
and opinions are classified into 4 categories: extreme ([−1,−0.75) ∪ (0.75, 1]), radical
([−0.75,−0.5)∪(0.5, 0.75]), biased ([−0.5,−0.25)∪(0.25, 0.5]), and moderate ([−0.25, 0.25]).
Panel A visualizes the spatial distribution of nodes adopting extreme opinions on a scale-free
network (27) with 1500 nodes. The layout of the nodes is arranged as follows: For each node i
with in-degree di, its radius from the center of the figure is ri = (maxk dk − di)5 and its angle
is randomly generated. Panel B shows the 2-dimension distributions over the in-degree and the
extremist-focus, for the the entire population and the extreme opinion holders respectively, in
1000 independent simulations of the weighted-median model on a randomly generated scale-
free network with 2000 nodes. Among these simulations, 37254 individuals in total eventually
adopt extreme opinions. Panel C is Fig. 5 in a previous paper (17), licensed under Creative
Commons CC0 public domain dedication (CC0 1.0). This figure plots the empirical distribu-
tion of randomly sampled Twitter users over in-degree and the ISIS focus (the ratio of their
social neighbors who support the ISIS terrorists). Panel D shows different models’ predictions
of the in-degree centrality distributions for individuals with various levels of extremeness at
the steady states. The empirical probability density curves are plotted by simulating different
opinion dynamics models for 1000 times on the scale-free network shown in Panel A.
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Fig. 4: Distributions of the initial opinions and the final opinions predicted by different
models. All simulations are run on the same scale-free network with 5000 nodes and starting
with the same randomly generated initial conditions. Comparisons conducted on a small-world
network (28) indicate similar conclusions and are provided in the Supplementary Materials.
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Fig. 5: Comparison of the effects of network size and clustering on the probability of
reaching consensus on randomly generated Watts-Strogatz small-world networks (28).
The clustering property depends on the rewiring probability β: The larger β, the less clustered
the network is. Note that, as shown in Panel B, the DeGroot, the DS, and the F-J models lead
to trivial predictions of either almost-sure consensus or almost-sure disagreement.
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Fig. 6: Examples of important concepts involved in the theoretical analysis of the
weighted-median opinion dynamics and the robustness of the theoretical results to net-
work perturbations. Panel A presents examples of cohesive set and maximal cohesive set.
For each node, the weights of their out-links (including the self loop) sum up to 1 and the self
loops, whose weights can be inferred, are omitted to avoid clutter. The set of dark blue nodes in
Panel A is a cohesive set but not maximally cohesive. The set of dark blue and light blue nodes
together is a maximal cohesive set. Panel B show the examples of decisive and indecisive links:
the links 1 → 3, 1 → 4 and 1 → 5 are decisive, whereas 1 → 2 is indecisive. Panel C shows
an influence network, where each individual assign their weights uniformly to all their social
neighbors, including the self loop omitted in the graph. A link from node 1 to 9 with weight
0.01 is added to the graph as a small perturbation (and node 1’s self weight decreases by 0.01).
Panel D shows, for the weighted-median model and the DeGroot model respectively, the effect
of such a perturbation of the opinion trajectories starting from the same initial condition. For
the two simulations of the weighted-median model, the node update sequence is set to be the
same.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
This self-contained supplement consists of four sections. Section 1 is a brief introduction of
the mathematical modeling of social networks. Section 2 reviews the classic DeGroot opinion
dynamics and their widely-studied extensions. Section 3 contains the model set-up and theo-
retical analysis of the weighted-median opinion dynamics. Section 4 compares the weighted-
median mechanism with the weighted-averaging mechanism via empirical-data analysis for a
set of online human-subject experiments. Section 5 provides the details of the numerical com-
parisons between the weighted-median model and the extensions of the DeGroot model.
S1 Algebraic graph theory: mathematical model of networks
In mathematics, networks are modeled as graphs. A graph is a triple G(V,E,A). Here V
denotes the set of nodes and V = {1, ..., n} for a network of n nodes. Let E ⊆ V × V be
the set of links defined as follows: (i, j) ∈ E if there exists a link from node i to node j. A
link from node i to itself is called a self loop. For any node i ∈ V , any node j with (i, j) ∈ E
is an out-neighbor of node i, while any node j with (j, i) ∈ E is an in-neighbor of node i.
Graphs in which the links are all undirected can be considered as the graphs in which all the
links are directed but bilateral. Therefore, in this supplement, we assume all the network links
to be directed, unless specified. The graph is weighted if a real-value weight is assigned to each
link. A directed and weighted graph with n nodes can be characterized by an n × n matrix
A = (aij)n×n, referred to as its adjacency matrix. For any i, j ∈ V , aij 6= 0 if and only if there
is a directed link from node i to node j. The value of aij , if non-zero, denotes the weight of the
link from i to j. Since the adjacency matrix contains all the information of a graph, the graph
associated with an adjacency matrix A can be denoted by G(A).
On a graph G(A), a path from node i0 to node i` with length ` is an ordered sequence of
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distinct nodes {i0, i1, . . . , i`}, in which aikik+1 6= 0 for any k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ` − 1}. A graph is
strongly connected if, for any i, j ∈ V , there is at least one path from i to j. A node i is a
globally reachable node if, for any j ∈ V , there exists a path from j to i. A path from node
i to itself, with no repeating node except i, is referred to as a cycle and the number of distinct
nodes involved is called the length of the cycle. A self loop is a cycle with length 1. The
greatest common divisor of the lengths of all the cycles in a graph is defined as the period of the
graph. A graph with period equal to 1 is called aperiodic. Apparently, a graph with self loops
is aperiodic.
A graph G′(V ′, E ′) is a subgraph of graph G(V,E) if V ′ ⊆ V and E ′ ⊆ E. A subgraph G′
is a strongly connected component of G if G′ is strongly connected and any other subgraph of
G strictly containing G′ is not strongly connected.
S2 Review of DeGroot Opinion Dynamics and Its Extensions
In this section, we review the model set-up and main results of the DeGroot model and its most
widely-studied extensions, including DeGroot model with absolutely stubborn individuals, the
Friedkin-Johnsen model, the bounded-confidence model, and the Altafini model.
S2.1 The classic DeGroot model
The classic DeGroot opinion dynamics (1) describe the evolution of individual opinions due to
social influence. Consider a group of n individuals discussing a certain issue. The DeGroot
model assumes that: 1) Individuals’ opinions on that issue are denoted by real numbers; 2)
Individuals update their opinions by taking weighted average opinions of those they are influ-
enced by. The mathematical form of the DeGroot opinion dynamics is given as a discrete-time
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difference equations system:
xi(t+ 1) =
n∑
j=1
wijxj(t), (S1)
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where xi(t) denotes the opinion of individual i at time t. The coefficient
wij represents how much weight individual i assigns to individual j’s current opinion in individ-
ual i’s opinion update, or, equivalently, the influence individual j has on individual i’s opinion
update. By the definition of weighted average,
∑n
j=1wij = 1 for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} andwij ≥ 0
for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The matrixW = (wij)n×n is referred to as the influence matrix, which
defines a weighted and directed graph G(W ), referred to as the influence network. In the influ-
ence network, each node is an individual, and there exists a directed link from node i to node j
if and only if wij 6= 0. In the rest of this supplement, we use the terms “node” and “individual”
interchangeably. The weights wij may describe a stable social structure among individuals and
be therefore exogenous to the opinion formation process, or may be formed upon listening to the
arguments of the individuals and be therefore endogenous. Endogenous weights may be more
realistic, but the cognitive mechanisms leading to their establishment are wide-ranging, com-
plex, and hard to model, e.g., see (24). On the contrary, exogenous group structures, which may
naturally arise in groups of individuals assembling repeatedly, are broadly adopted to obtain a
predictive model.
The main theoretical predictions of the DeGroot model is summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (Dynamical behavior of DeGroot opinion dynamics) Consider the DeGroot
model given by equation (S1), with wij ≥ 0 for each i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ∑nj=1wij = 1 for
any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. If the graph G(W ) has a globally reachable node and the strongly con-
nected component containing the globally reachable node is aperiodic, then all the individuals’
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opinions reach consensus asymptotically, that is,
lim
t→∞x(t) = ω
>x(0)1n, (S2)
where x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xn(t))>, 1n is the n× 1 vector with all the entries equal to 1, and ω is
the unique vector satisfying ω>W = ω> and ωi > 0 for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The classic DeGroot opinion dynamics model is mathematically elegant and explains some
desired features of opinion evolution in social groups, such as the reduction of opinion vari-
ance via group discussions and the containment of individual opinions in the convex hull of
their initial states. That is,
∑
i(xi(t) − ω>x(0))2 is larger at t = 0 than for t → ∞, and
mink xk(0) ≤ xi(t) ≤ maxk xk(0) for any i and t. However, the DeGroot model has two non-
negligible shortcomings. On the microscopic side, the DeGroot model is based on a weighted-
average opinion update mechanism, which implies that far-away opinions are more attractive
than nearby opinions, as we have discussed in the main text. On the macroscopic side, as The-
orem 2.1 implies, the DeGroot model predicts asymptotic consensus under mild conditions on
the connectivity of the influence network. Such a prediction is overly simplified and unrealis-
tic. Moreover, the microscopic shortcoming, i.e., the unrealistic implication of the weighted-
average mechanism, is the very intuition behind the unrealistic macroscopic prediction of the
DeGroot model.
S2.2 Empirical data on steady multi-modal opinion distributions
Empirical observations indicate that, contrasting to the prediction of consensus by DeGroot
model, persistent disagreement is quite common in social groups. Moreover, in large-scale
social networks, we often observe steady-state opinion distributions and the distribution can be
either uni-modal or multi-modal. Fig. S1 provide a longitudinal empirical data on European
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people’s attitude towards the effect of immigration of local culture. The data is obtained from
the European Social Survey website: http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/.
To remedy the always-consensus prediction by the DeGroot model, various extensions have
been proposed by introducing additional mechanisms and parameters. In the rest of this section,
we will review some of the widely-studied extensions of the classic DeGroot Model.
S2.3 DeGroot opinion dynamics with absolutely stubborn individuals
Acemoglu et al. (2) extend the classic DeGroot model by considering the presence of abso-
lutely stubborn individuals, i.e., individuals who assign zero weight to anyone else but assign
full weights to themselves. Consider a group of n individuals, in which r of them are regular
individuals and s of them are absolutely stubborn (with n = r+ s). Denote by x(r)(t) the opin-
ion vector of the regular individuals and x(s)(t) the opinion vector of the absolutely stubborn
individuals. Let x(t) = (x(r)(t)>, x(s)(t)>)>. The dynamics of x(t) are written as
x(t+ 1) =
 x(r)(t+ 1)
x(s)(t+ 1)
 =
 W (r,r) W (r,s)
0s×r Is×s

 x(r)(t)
x(s)(t)
 = Wx(t), (S3)
where W (r,r) and W (r,s) are r × r and r × s matrices respectively. The relation between x(t)
and x(0) is thus given in the form
x(t) = W (t)x(0) =
 W (r,r)(t) W (r,s)(t)
0s×r Is×s

 x(r)(0)
x(s)(0)
 . (S4)
According to the equation above, x(s)(t) = x(s)(0) for any t, i.e., the absolutely stubborn indi-
viduals never change their opinions. The main theoretical results are summarized below (2).
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Theorem 2.2 (Dynamical behavior of DeGroot model with absolutely stubborn individuals)
Consider the opinion dynamics model given by equation (S3), with wij ≥ 0 for any i, j ∈
{1, . . . , n} and ∑nj=1wij = 1 for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Assume that, on the influence network
G(W ), for each regular individual, there exists at least one directed path to one of the absolutely
stubborn individuals. The following statements hold:
1. The matrix W (r,r)(t) satisfies that limt→∞W (r,r)(t) = 0r×r;
2. There exists a r× 1 vector x(r)(∞) such that limt→∞ x(r)(t) = x(r)(∞). That is, the final
opinions of the regular individuals converge;
3. The regular individuals’ final opinion x(r)(∞) satisfies
x(r)(∞) = W (r,r)x(r)(∞) +W (r,s)x(s)(0), and x(r)(∞) =
∞∑
k=0
(
W (r,r)
)k
W (r,s)x(s)(0);
(S5)
4. The r × s matrix ∑∞k=0 (W (r,r))kW (r,s) is entry-wise non-negative and satisfies∑∞
k=0
(
W (r,r)
)k
W (r,s)1s = 1r, that is, the final opinion of any regular individual is a
convex combination of the initial opinions of the absolutely stubborn individuals.
With the presence of absolutely stubborn individuals, the extended DeGroot model given
by (S3) generates long-run disagreement and, in a stochastic and gossip set-up, predicts persis-
tent opinion fluctuations (2). However, such predictions depend on the assumption that some
individuals are absolutely stubborn. This assumption might be reasonable for some certain cat-
egory of issues being discussed, or in some scenarios in which there are opinion manipulators.
However, in many scenarios, absolute stubbornness is not a realistic assumption, and there is
no widely supported mechanism to decide a priori which individuals are absolutely stubborn
and which are not. Moreover, the model suffers from non-robustness in the sense that its pre-
diction immediately degenerates to a consensus as long as the “stubborn” individuals assign
43
any infinitesimal influence to other people. In addition, even with the absolute stubbornness
assumption, the DeGroot model is still unable to predict multi-modal steady-state opinion dis-
tribution when the initial opinion distribution is multi-modal, unless by deliberately picking the
absolutely stubborn individuals based on their initial opinions and their locations in the network.
S2.4 The Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics model
Friedkin et al. (4) extend the classic DeGroot model by considering individuals’ persistent at-
tachments to their initial opinions. Such a model is referred to as the Friedkin-Johnsen (F-J)
model, whose mathematical form is given by
x(t+ 1) = AWx(t) + (I − A)x(0), (S6)
where A = diag(a1, . . . , an) and each ai ∈ [0, 1] characterizes individual i’s attachment to their
initial opinion. In this model set-up, an individual i is called stubborn if ai < 1. The main
results on the asymptotic behavior of system (S6) is summarized as follows (4):
Theorem 2.3 (Dynamical behavior of Friedkin-Johnsen model) Consider the opinion dy-
namics model given by equation (S6). Assume that, on the influence network G(W ), the set of
stubborn individuals are globally reachable, i.e., any individual has a directed path connected to
at least one stubborn agent. The following statements hold:
1. The individuals’ opinions at any time t ≥ 1 are convex combinations of the group’s initial
opinions, i.e.., x(t) = V (t)x(0), where V (t) = (AW )t+(AW )t−1(I−A)+. . .+(I−A).
Moreover, limk→∞(AW )k = 0 and limk→∞ V (k) = V = (I − AW )−1(I − A);
2. Matrix V = (vij)n×n is entry-wise non-negative and satisfies
∑n
j=1 vij = 1 for any i;
3. The limit limt→∞ x(t) = x(∞) exists and x(∞) = V x(0), i.e., each individual i’s final
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opinion xi(∞) is a convex combination of the group’s initial opinions x(0).
By introducing n additional parameters a1, . . . , an, the Friedkin-Johnsen model captures in-
dividuals’ stubbornness, i.e., persistent attachment to initial opinions, in opinion exchange. The
Friedkin-Johnsen model predicts disagreement whenever there are two stubborn agents with
different initial opinions, which is almost surely true for generic initial conditions. As pointed
out in (19), the Friedkin-Johnsen model predicts steady multi-modal opinion distribution if the
parameters a1, . . . , an are deliberately tuned according to the group’s initial opinions.
S2.5 The bounded-confidence model
The deterministic bounded-confidence model was first formulated by Hegselmann and
Krause (3) to characterize the effect that individuals are only influenced by the opinions they
perceive to be “reasonable”, i.e., opinions within certain distance ranges, referred to as confi-
dence bounds, from their own opinions. A stochastic and gossip-like version of the bounded-
confidence model was proposed by Deffuant and Weisbuch (31). The deterministic and syn-
chronous bounded-confidence models can be classified from various aspects: the agent-based
models assume finite number of individuals in social groups, while the continuum models as-
sume uncountably infinite numbers of individuals and consider social groups as continuum; The
homogeneous bounded-confidence model assumes that the individuals’ confidence bounds are
all the same, while the heterogeneous bounded-confidence assume that each individual has their
own confidence bound.
The agent-based homogeneous bounded-confidence model, with synchronous opinion up-
dates, has been thoroughly discussed by Blondel et al. (32). This model assumes that the indi-
45
viduals’ confidence bounds are all equal to 1. Its mathematical form is given as
xi(t+ 1) =
∑
j:|xj(t)−xi(t)|<1 xj(t)∑
j:|xj(t)−xi(t)|<1 1
, for any i. (S7)
The main results on the dynamical behavior of system (S7) is summarized below (32):
Theorem 2.4 (Dynamical behavior of bounded-confidence model) Consider the agent-based
homogeneous bounded-confidence model given by equation (S7). We have that:
1. The individual opinions converge, i.e., limt→∞ xi(t) = x∗i exists for any i;
2. For any individual i and j, either x∗i = x
∗
j or |x∗i − x∗j | ≥ 1.
Note that the bounded-confidence model introduced above implies an all-to-all underlying
influence network, that is, any pair of individuals can influence each other as long as their opin-
ions are sufficiently close. The bounded-confidence model predicts the formation of opinion
clusters and has richer dynamical behavior than classic DeGroot model, e.g., the bounded-
confidence model exhibit a phase transition between consensus and disagreement (multiple
opinion clusters). However, due to its mathematical complexity, the bounded-confidence model
is almost at the edge of losing mathematical tractability. The convergence of opinions in the
heterogeneous bounded-confidence model is still an open question. The bounded-confidence
model has been extended to a network set-up as well. However, due to its mathematical in-
tractability, such a networked bounded-confidence model is rarely studied and barely under-
stood in previous literature, except for some simulation results (33) and some preliminary theo-
retical analysis (34). The set-up of the networked bounded-confidence model is introduced later
in Section S4.
A major microscopic shortcoming of the bounded-confidence model is that it implies an un-
natural individual behavior: within the confidence bounds, distant opinions are more attractive,
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but distant opinions immediately become unattractive at all once outside the confidence bounds.
This microscopic shortcoming is due to the combination of weighted-average opinion updates
and the artificial truncation of social influences according to opinion distances. Moreover, the
bounded-confidence model exhibits an undesired convergence property when extended to arbi-
trary incomplete graphs: As proved by Parasnis et al. (26), for any connected and incomplete
graph, under a certain mild assumption, the expected termination time of the network bounded-
confidence model is infinity.
S2.6 The Altafini model
Altafini (35) extends the DeGroot model by considering the presence of antagonistic relations
in social groups, which are modeled as negative weights in the influence networks. The model
proposed in (35) is in continuous time. The discrete-time counterpart is of the same form as
DeGroot model:
x(t+ 1) = Wx(t), (S8)
where the matrix W = (wij)n×n satisfies
∑n
j=1 |wij| = 1 for any i. But W in equation (S8)
is not necessarily entry-wise non-negative. This discrete-time model is analyzed in (36). The
dynamical behavior of the Altafini model depends on a specific property of the influence net-
work, called structural balance (37). A strongly connected influence network is structurally
balanced if and only if all its directed cycles are positive. By “positive cycles” we mean the
directed cycles in which there are no or even number of links with negative weights. With the
notion of structural balance, the main results of the discrete-time Altafini model is summarized
as follows (35):
Theorem 2.5 (Dynamical behavior of Altafini model) Consider the Altafini model given by
equation (S8). The following statements hold:
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1. If the influence network G(W ) is structurally balanced, then the individuals reach modu-
lar consensus, i.e., there exists x∗ > 0 such that limt→∞ |xi(t)| = x∗ for any i; More-
over, the individuals can be partitioned into two sets (factions) V1 and V2 such that
limt→∞ xi(t) = x∗ for any i ∈ V1 and limt→∞ xj(t) = −x∗ for any j ∈ V2. The links
within each faction are all positive, and the inter-faction links are all negative;
2. If the influence network G(W ) is structurally unbalanced, then limt→∞ xi(t) = 0 for any
individual i.
The Altafini model predicts opinion polarization when the influence network is structurally
balanced. However, not all the social influence networks in reality are structurally balanced.
With a structurally unbalanced influence network, the Altafini model predicts that all the indi-
viduals’ opinions eventually become neutral. Such a prediction is not sociologically meaning-
ful.
Last but not least, all the models reviewed above are based on weighted-average opinion
updates and thereby they all inherit the unrealistic implication by DeGroot model that distant
opinions (with positive weights) are more attractive.
S3 The Weighted-Median Opinion Dynamics
In this section we present in details the model set-up and theoretical analysis of the weighted-
median opinion dynamics.
S3.1 Model set-up
Before proposing the weighted-median opinion dynamics, we first define the notion of weighted
median.
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Definition 3.1 (Weighted median) Given any n-tuple of real numbers x = (x1, . . . , xn) and
the associated n-tuple of nonnegative weights w = (w1, . . . , wn), where
∑n
i=1wi = 1, the
weighted median of x, associated with the weights w, is denoted by Med(x;w) and defined as
the real number x∗ ∈ {x1, . . . , xn} such that
∑
i:xi<x∗
wi ≤ 1/2, and
∑
i:xi>x∗
wi ≤ 1/2. (S9)
By carefully examining this definition, one could observe that, in some rare cases associ-
ated with certain weights w, there might exist multiple weighted medians of x satisfying the
definitions above. Here we point out the following facts:
1. The weighted median of x associated with the weights w is unique if and only if there
exists x∗ ∈ {x1, . . . , xn} such that
∑
i:xi<x∗
wi <
1
2
,
∑
i:xi=x∗
wi > 0, and
∑
i:xi>x∗
wi < 1/2. (S10)
Such an x∗ is the unique weighted median;
2. The weighted medians of x associated with the weights w are NOT unique if and only if
there exists z ∈ {x1, . . . , xn} such that ∑i:xi<z wi = ∑i:xi≥z wi = 1/2. Among all the
weighted medians of x, the smallest one, denoted by x∗, satisfies
∑
i:xi<x∗
wi <
1
2
,
∑
i:xi=x∗
wi > 0, and
∑
i:xi>x∗
wi =
1
2
, (S11)
while the largest weighted median, denoted by x∗, satisfies
∑
i:xi<x
∗
wi =
1
2
,
∑
i:xi=x
∗
wi > 0, and
∑
i:xi>x
∗
<
1
2
. (S12)
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Moreover, if there exists any xˆ ∈ {x1, . . . , xn} such that x∗ < xˆ < x∗, then xˆ is also a
weighted median and it must hold that
∑
i:xi=xˆwi = 0.
For generic weights, e.g., if w1, . . . , wn are independently randomly generated from some con-
tinuous probability distributions, the case in Fact 2 never occurs since almost surely there does
not exist any θ ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that ∑i∈θ wi = 1/2. Therefore, given generic weights w, the
weighted median of x is unique.
In order to avoid unnecessary mathematical complexity, we would like to make each in-
dividual’s opinion update well-defined and deterministic. Therefore, in the weighted-median
opinion dynamics, we slightly change the definition of weighted median when it is not unique
according to Definition 3.1. Consider a group of n individuals discussing certain issue. De-
note by xi(t) the opinion of individual i at time t and let x(t) be the n-tuple (x1(t), . . . , xn(t)).
The interpersonal influences are characterized by the influence matrix W = (wij)n×n, which
is entry-wise non-negative and satisfies
∑n
j=1wij = 1 for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The formal
definition of weighted-median opinion dynamics is given as follows.
Definition 3.2 (Weighted-median opinion dynamics) Consider a group of n individuals dis-
cussing on some certain issue, with the influence matrix given byW = (wij)n×n. The weighted-
median opinion dynamics is defined as the following process: At each time t+1, one individual
i is randomly picked and update their opinion according to the following equation:
xi(t+ 1) = Medi(x(t);W ), (S13)
where Medi(x(t);W ) is the weighted median of x(t) associated with the weights given by the i-
th row ofW , i.e., (wi1, wi2, . . . , win). Medi(x(t);W ) is well-defined if such a weighted-median
is unique. If the weighted-median is not unique, then let Medi(x(t);W ) be the weighted median
that is the closest to xi(t).
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This set-up guarantees the uniqueness of Medi(x;W ) since only one of the following 3
cases can occur when the weighted medians are not unique:
1. xi ≤ x∗, where x∗ is the smallest weighted median of x associated with the weights
(w1, . . . , wn). In this case, Medi(x;W ) = x∗ is unique;
2. xi ≥ x∗, where x∗ is the largest weighted median of x associated with the weights
(w1, . . . , wn). In this case, Medi(x;W ) = x∗ is unique;
3. x∗ < xi < x∗. According to Fact 2 in last paragraph, this must imply that
∑
j:xj=xi wij =
0 and xi is also a weighted median of x associated with the weights (w1, . . . , wn). There-
fore, in this case, Medi(x;W ) = xi is also unique.
Note that, if the entries of W are randomly generated from some continuous distributions,
then, for any subset of the links on the influence network G(W ), the sum of their weights is
almost surely not equal to 1/2. As a consequence, the weighted median for each individual
at any time is almost surely unique. Therefore, for generic influence networks, the weighted-
median opinion dynamics defined by Definition 3.2 follows a simple rule and is consistent with
the formal definition of weighted median given in Definition 3.1. In the rest of this article, by
weighted-median opinion dynamics, or weighted-median model, we mean the dynamical sys-
tem described by Definition 3.2. According to Definition 3.2, for any given initial condition
x(0) = (x0,1, . . . , x0,n)
>, the solution x(t) to the weighted-median opinion dynamics satisfies
xi(t) ∈ {x0,1, . . . , x0,n} for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and any t ≥ 0. Moreover, according to Defini-
tion 3.2, for each node i,
xi(t+ 1) > xi(t) if and only if
∑
j:xj(t)>xi(t)
wij > 1/2, (S14)
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and
xi(t+ 1) < xi(t) if and only if
∑
j:xj(t)<xi(t)
wij > 1/2. (S15)
S3.2 Derivation of weighted-median opinion dynamics
In the seminal work by Festinger on cognitive dissonance (10), the author states that:
“The open expression of disagreement in a group leads to the existence of cognitive
dissonance in the members. The knowledge that some other person, generally like oneself,
holds one opinion is dissonant with holding a contrary opinion. ”
Matz et al. (11) conduct three experimental studies and obtain the following conclusions: (1)
Attitude/opinion heterogeneity in groups is experienced as discomfort; (2) The discomfort gen-
erated by disagreement is attributed to cognitive consistency pressures, rather than other alter-
native motives associated with interaction and consensus seeking; (3) Social groups are not only
a source of dissonance but also a means of dissonance resolution, by achieving consensus.
The psychological studies above indicate that opinions dynamics could be considered as a
network game, in which individuals’ costs are the cognitive dissonances they experience in the
social group, modeled as functions of the opinion distances from their social neighbors on the
influence network. It is reasonable to premise that individuals in a social group adjust their
opinions to minimize their cognitive dissonances. Groeber et al. (38) formalize various opinion
dynamics models in previous literature as best-response dynamics in the framework of cognitive
dissonance minimization.
Independently of whether an individual is aware of the cognitive dissonance or not, and
independently of whether there is a widely accepted psychological explanation, DeGroot aver-
aging is mathematically equivalent to the solution of several optimization problems, the most
parsimonious of which is the quadratic cost, see the main text. Moreover, the cognitive disso-
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nance must be of the quadratic form if we accept the following two reasonable assumptions: 1)
For each individual, the cognitive dissonance is the sum of the dissonances generated by each
of their social neighbors; 2) The dissonance generated by the opinion difference between any
individual i and j is a function of their opinion distance. The quadratic form of cognitive disso-
nance implies that, given the same weight, a unit shift towards a distant opinion reduces much
more cognitive dissonance than a unit shift towards a nearby opinion. Therefore, DeGroot and
other weighted-averaging based opinion dynamics imply that individuals are more sensitive to
distant opinions, for which there is no widely accepted psychological support.
More generally, the most parsimonious form of cognitive dissonance generated by disagree-
ment could be of the form
∑
j wij|xi(t) − xj(t)|α with α > 0, e.g., α = 2 for the DeGroot
model. An exponent α > 1 implies that individuals are more sensitive to distant opinions,
whereas α < 1 implies that individuals are more sensitive to nearby opinions. In the absence
of widely-accepted psychological theory explicitly in favor of α > 1 or α < 1, the weighted-
median model adopts the neutral hypothesis α = 1. The best-response dynamics corresponding
to α = 1 are written as follows:
xi(t+ 1) = argminz
n∑
j=1
wij|z − xj(t)|, (S16)
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We use equality here in the sense that the right-hand side of the equation
above is unique for generic weights wij’s. The following proposition states the relation between
the system given by equation (S16) and the weighted-median opinion dynamics. This proposi-
tion is a straightforward consequence of Definition 3.1 in this Supplementary Information and
Lemma 3.1 in the paper by Sabo et al. (39).
Proposition 3.1 (Weighted-median model as best-response dynamics) Given the entry-wise
non-negative influence matrix W = (wij)n×n and the vector x = (x1, . . . , xn)
>, the following
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equation holds: for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
1. If there exists x∗ ∈ {x1, . . . , xn} such that
∑
j:xj<x∗
wij <
1
2
, and
∑
j:xj>x∗
wij <
1
2
, (S17)
then
Medi(x;W ) = x∗ = argminz
n∑
j=1
wij|z − xj|; (S18)
2. If there does not exist such x∗, then the set
Mi(x;W ) =
{
y ∈ {x1, . . . , xn}
∣∣∣ ∑
j:xj≤y
wij ≤ 1
2
,
∑
j:xj>y
wij ≤ 1
2
}
(S19)
is non-empty and
Medi(x;W ) = argminy∈Mi(x;W )|y − xi| (S20)
∈ [ inf Mi(x;W ), supMi(x;W )] = argminz
n∑
j=1
n∑
j=1
wij|z − xj|. (S21)
S3.3 Theoretical analysis of weighted-median opinion dynamics
In this subsection we present the theoretical results on the weighted-median model. The dynam-
ical behavior of our model is determined by some important structures of the influence network,
such as the maximal cohesive sets and the decisive links. A more generalized definition of co-
hesive sets is given in (21), and applied in the linear-threshold network diffusion model (22).
First of all, we introduce those important notions.
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S3.3.1 Important notions: cohesive set and decisive links
Definition 3.3 (Cohesive set and maximal cohesive set) Given an influence network G(W ) with
node set V , a cohesive set M ⊆ V is a subset of nodes that satisfies ∑j∈M wij ≥ 1/2 for any
i ∈M . A cohesive set M is a maximal cohesive set if there does not exists i ∈ V \M such that∑
j∈M wij > 1/2.
Regarding the notions of cohesive set and maximal cohesive set, we refer to Panels A and B
of Fig S2 for illustrations. Note that, in the weighted-median opinion dynamics, if all the nodes
in a cohesive set adopt the same opinion, then none of the nodes in this cohesive set will change
their opinions along the dynamics.
Definition 3.4 (Cohesive expansion) Given an influence network G(W ) with node set V
and a subset of nodes M ⊆ V , the cohesive expansion of M , denoted by Expansion(M), is the
subset of V constructed via the following iteration algorithm:
1. Let M0 = M ;
2. For k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., if there exists i ∈ V \ Mk such that ∑j∈Mk wij > 1/2, then let
Mk+1 = Mk ∪ {i};
3. Terminate the iteration at step k as long as there does not exists any i ∈ V \Mk such that∑
j∈Mk wij > 1/2, and let Expansion(V˜ ) = Mk.
The following lemma presents some important properties of cohesive expansions.
Lemma 3.2 (Properties of cohesive expansion) Given an influence networkG(W ) with node
set V , the following statements hold:
1. For any M ⊆ V , the cohesive expansion of M is unique, i.e., independent of the order of
node additions;
2. For any M, M˜ ⊆ V , if M ⊆ M˜ , then Expansion(M) ⊆ Expansion(M˜);
55
3. For any M, M˜ ⊆ V , Expansion(M) ∪ Expansion(M˜) ⊆ Expansion(M ∪ M˜); and
4. If M is a cohesive set, then Expansion(M) is also cohesive and is the smallest maximal
cohesive set that contains M , that is, for any maximal cohesive set Mˆ such that M ⊆ Mˆ ,
we have Expansion(M) ⊆ Mˆ .
Proof: For any cohesive set M ⊆ V , suppose that E1 = M ∪ (i1, . . . , ik) and E2 =
M ∪ (j1, . . . , j`) are both cohesive expansions of M and E1 6= E2. Here (i1, . . . , ik) means the
ordered set containing i1, . . . , ik. If E1 ⊆ E2, let s = min {r | jr /∈ (i1, . . . , ik)} and then we
have M ∪ (j1, . . . , js−1) ⊆ E1 (For convenience we let (j1, . . . , js−1) = φ if s = 1.). According
to the expansion of M to E2, we have
∑
r∈E1
wjsr ≥
∑
r∈M∪(j1,...,js−1)
wjsr > 1/2. (S22)
Therefore, E1 can be further expanded to E1∪ (js), which contradicts the assumption that E1 is
already a cohesive expansion of M . We conclude that E1 ⊆ E2 can not be true. Following the
same argument, we have that E2 ⊆ E1 can not be true. Since neither E1 ⊆ E2 nor E2 ⊆ E1 is
true, there exists js0 , where s0 ∈ {1, . . . , `}, such that js0 /∈ (i1, . . . , ik). First of all, s0 can not
be 1, otherwise ∑
r∈E1
wj1r ≥
∑
r∈M
wj1r > 1/2 (S23)
implies thatE1 can be further expanded toE1∪(j1). Secondly, there must exist s1 ∈ {1, . . . , s0−
1} such that js1 /∈ (i1, . . . , ik), otherwise M ∪ (j1, . . . , js0−1) ⊆ E1 and
∑
r∈E1
wjs0r ≥
∑
r∈M∪(j1,...,js0−1)
wjs0r > 1/2, (S24)
which implies that E1 can be further expanded to E1 ∪ (js0). As the same argument goes on,
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we will obtain that j1 /∈ (i1, . . . , ik). But we have already shown that j1 /∈ (i1, . . . , ik) can not
be true. Therefore, it must not hold that E1 6= E2. This concludes the proof of Statement 1.
For any set of nodes (i1, . . . , ik) and node ik+1, let Vk = M ∪ (i1, . . . , ik) and V˜k =
M˜ ∪ (i1, . . . , ik). Suppose M ⊆ M˜ . If ∑j∈Vk wik+1j > 1/2, then, since M ⊆ M˜ , we
have
∑
j∈V˜k wik+1j =
∑
j∈Vk wik+1j +
∑
j∈M˜\M wik+1j > 1/2. Therefore, Expansion(M) ⊆
Expansion(M˜). This concludes the proof of Statement 2.
According to Statement 2, sinceM ⊆M∪M˜ and M˜ ⊆M∪M˜ , we have Expansion(M) ⊆
Expansion(M ∪ M˜) and Expansion(M˜) ⊆ Expansion(M ∪ M˜). Therefore, Expansion(M˜) ∪
Expansion(M) ⊆ Expansion(M ∪ M˜). This concludes the proof of Statement 3.
If M is cohesive, for any i ∈M , obviously we have
∑
k∈Expansion(M)
wik ≥
∑
k∈M
wik ≥ 1
2
. (S25)
For any i ∈ Expansion(M) \ M , if any, suppose the node i is added at some step t in the
expansion process described in Definition 3.4. We have
∑
k∈Expansion(M)
wik ≥
∑
k∈Mt−1
wik >
1
2
, (S26)
where Mt−1 is as defined in Definition 3.4. This proves the statement that Expansion(M) is co-
hesive. From Definitions 3.3 and 3.4, a cohesive set M˜ is maximal if and only if Expansion(M˜)
= M˜ . Consider a cohesive set M and a maximal cohesive set M˜ such that M ⊆ M˜ . By state-
ment 2 and the previous observation, we have Expansion(M) ⊆ Expansion(M˜) = M˜ , which
concludes the proof of statement 4.
Below we present another useful lemma on cohesive sets. The proof is straightforward by
definitions of cohesive expansion and maximal cohesive set.
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Lemma 3.3 (Cohesive partition) Given an influence network G(W ) with node set v and a
cohesive set M ⊆ V . Either of the following two statements holds:
1. Expansion(M) = V ;
2. Expansion(M) and V \ Expansion(M) are both non-empty and maximally cohesive.
Definition 3.5 (Decisive and indecisive out-links) Given an influence network G(W ) with
the node set V , define the out-neighbor set of each node i as Ni = {j ∈ V |wij 6= 0}. A link
(i, j) is a decisive out-link of node i, if there exists a subset θ ⊆ Ni such that the following three
conditions hold: (1) j ∈ θ; (2) ∑k∈θ wik > 1/2; (3) ∑k∈θ\{j}wik < 1/2. Otherwise, the link
(i, j) is an indecisive out-link of node i.
We refer to Panel C of Fig. S2 for an illustration of the notions of decisive and indecisive
links.
S3.3.2 Equilibria set and Dynamical behavior of weighted-median opinion dynamics
In this subsection, we characterize the set of equilibria and the dynamical behavior of the
weighted-median opinion dynamics. As shown in Section 3.2, the weighted-median opinion
dynamics can be derived from a network game set-up, where the individuals are the players,
whose strategies are their opinions, and, for each individual i, their cost function is their cogni-
tive dissonance, written as Ci(xi, x−i) =
∑n
j=1wij|xi − xj|. Here x−i denotes the opinions of
all the other individuals. An opinion vector x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of this network game if,
for any i, Ci(x∗i , x
∗
−i) ≤ Ci(xi, x∗−i), for any xi. As for the weighted-median opinion dynamics,
x∗ is an equilibrium if x∗i = Medi(x
∗;W ) for any i. The following theorem establishes the
relations among the Nash equilibria of the network game, the equilibria of the weighted-median
opinion dynamics, and the structure of the influence network.
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Theorem 3.4 (Set of equilibria) Given an influence network G(W ) with n individuals sat-
isfying that
∑
j∈θ wij 6= 1/2 for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and any θ ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, consider the
weighted-median opinion dynamics and the associated network game on G(W ). The following
statements are equivalent:
1. x∗ is an equilibrium of the weighted-median opinion dynamics, i.e., x∗i = Medi(x
∗;W )
for any i;
2. x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the network game, i.e., for any i, the inequality Ci(x∗i , x
∗
−i) ≤
Ci(xi, x
∗
−i) holds for any xi;
3. x∗ is either a consensus vector, i.e., x∗i = x
∗
j for any i and j, or satisfy the following
condition: for any mini x∗i < y < maxi x
∗
i , both {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} |x∗i < y} and {i ∈
{1, . . . , n} |x∗i ≥ y} are maximal cohesive sets on G(W ).
Proof: According to Definition 3.1, Definition 3.2 and Proposition 3.1, if
∑
j∈θ wij 6= 1/2
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and θ ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, then, for any given x, argminz
∑n
j=1wij|z − xj| is
unique and
argminz
n∑
j=1
wij|z − xj| = Medi(x;W ). (S27)
Therefore, x∗i = Medi(x
∗;W ) for any i if and only if x∗i = argminz
∑n
j=1wij|z − x∗j | for
any i, i.e., Ci(x∗i , x
∗
−i) ≤ Ci(xi, x∗−i). This concludes the proof for the equivalence between
statements 1 and 2.
Now we prove the equivalence between statements 1 and 3. We first show that statement 3
leads to statement 1. If x∗ is a consensus vector, apparently x∗i = Medi(x
∗;W ) for any i. If
x∗ is not a consensus vector but satisfies that, for any y ∈ (mink x∗k,maxk x∗k), {j|x∗j < y} and
{j|x∗j ≥ y} are both maximal cohesive sets. For any given i, let y = x∗i . Since i ∈ {j |x∗j ≥ x∗i }
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and {j |x∗j ≥ x∗i } is a maximal cohesive set, we have
∑
j:x∗j≥x∗i
wij ≥ 1
2
⇒ Medi(x∗;W ) ≥ x∗i . (S28)
Let y˜ = mink{xk |x∗k > x∗i }. Since i ∈ {j |x∗i < y˜} and {j |x∗i < y˜} is a maximal cohesive
set, we have ∑
j:x∗j<y˜
wij ≥ 1
2
⇒ Medi(x∗;W ) < y˜. (S29)
The inequality x∗i ≤ Medi(x∗;W ) < y˜ leads to x∗i = Medi(x∗;W ). Therefore, statement 3
implies statement 1.
Now we prove by contradiction that statement 1 implies statement 3. Suppose x∗ is not
a consensus vector and there exists y ∈ (mink x∗k,maxk x∗k) such that either {j|x∗j < y} or
{j|x∗j ≥ y} is not a maximal cohesive set. Since these two sets form a disjoint partition of
the node set {1, . . . , n}, one of them must not be cohesive. Without loss of generality, suppose
{j |x∗j ≥ y} is not cohesive. As a direct consequence, there exists i with x∗i ≥ y but
∑
j:x∗j<y
wij >
1
2
, (S30)
which in turn implies that Medi(x∗;W ) < y ≤ x∗i . Therefore, such x∗ cannot be an equilibrium
of the weighted-median opinion dynamics. This concludes the proof that statements 1 and 3 are
equivalent.
Theorem 3.4 requires that
∑
j∈θ wij 6= 1/2 for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and any θ ⊂ {1, . . . , n}.
Generically, this condition always holds if we assume that the weights wij are randomly gener-
ated from some continuous distributions, or are perturbed by some random noises.
Regarding the dynamical behavior of the weighted-median opinion dynamics, we first es-
tablish the almost-sure convergence of individual opinions to fixed points in finite time, and then
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provide conditions for convergence to consensus and disagreement respectively. The following
lemma provides an important mathematical tool used in the proof of our main theorem.
Lemma 3.5 (Convergence by manually picking the update order) Consider the weighted-
median opinion dynamics given by Definition 3.2. If, for any x, there exists some Tx ∈
{1, 2, . . .} and some update order i1, . . . , iTx such that the solution to the weighted-median
opinion dynamics starting from x reaches a fixed point at time step Tx by adopting this update
order, then the solution to the weighted-median opinion dynamics, defined by Definition 3.2,
almost surely converges to a fixed point in finite time, for any initial condition x(0).
Proof: For any given x(0) ∈ Rn, due to the definition of weighted-median, we have x(t) ∈
Ω = {x1(0), . . . , xn(0)}n along any update sequence. Here Ω is a finite set of n-dimension
vectors in Rn. Since, for any x ∈ Ω,
Prob[x(t+ 1) = x(i) |x(t) = x] = 1/n (S31)
for any x(i) ∈ Ω satisfying x(i)i = Medi(x;W ) and x(i)j = xj for any j 6= i, the weighted-
median opinion dynamics is a Markov chain over the finite state space Ω. This Markov chain
has absorbing states, e.g., all the consensus states. Moreover, for any x ∈ Ω, there exists at
least one update sequence along which the trajectory x(t) starting from x reaches a fixed point.
Therefore, the weighted-median opinion dynamics is an absorbing Markov chain. According to
Theorem 11.3 in the textbook (40), x(t) starting from x(0) almost surely converges to a fixed
point. Since the stochastic process x(t) is a finite-state Markov chain, x(t) reaches a fixed point
almost surely in finite time.
With all the preparation work above, below we present our main theorem on the dynamical
behavior of the weighted-median opinion dynamics..
Theorem 3.6 (Dynamical behavior of weighted-median model) Consider the weighted-
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median opinion dynamics given by Definition 3.2, on an influence networkG(W ) with node set
V . Denote by Gdecisive(W ) the subgraph of G(W ) with all the indecisive out-links removed.
The following statements hold,
1. for any initial condition x0 ∈ Rn, the solution x(t) almost surely converges to a fixed
point x∗ in finite time;
2. if the only maximal cohesive set of G(W ) is V , then, for any initial condition x0 ∈ Rn,
the solution x(t) almost surely converges to a consensus state;
3. if the graphG(W ) has a maximal cohesive setM 6= V , then there exists a subset of initial
conditions X0 ⊆ Rn with non-zero Lebesgue measure in Rn such that, for any x0 ∈ X0,
there is no update sequence along which the solution converges to consensus; and
4. If Gdecisive(W ) does not have a globally reachable node, then, for any initial condition
x0 ∈ Rn, the solution x(t) almost surely reaches a non-consensus fixed point in finite
time.
Proof: We first point out that the following two claims are equivalent: (1) For any initial
state x(0), the solution x(t) almost surely converges to an equilibrium state x∗ in finite time;
(2) For any initial state x(0), there exists an update sequence {i1, . . . , iT} such that the solution
x(t) reaches a fixed point after T steps of update if node it is updated at time step t for any
t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. (1)⇒ (2) is obvious and (2)⇒ (1) is a straightforward result of Lemma 3.5.
Now we prove that claim (2) is true. We first consider the case in which there are only two
different opinions initially in the network. Without loss of generality, let the two opinions be
y1 and y2. Due to the weighted-median update rule given by Definition 3.2, for any initial state
x(0) ∈ {y1, y2}n, the solution x(t) satisfies x(t) ∈ {y1, y2}n for any t ≥ 0. Let
V1(t) = {i ∈ V |xi(t) = y1}, V2(t) = {i ∈ V |xi(t) = y2}, (S32)
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for any non-negative integer t. We neglect the trivial cases when V1(0) = V or V2(0) = V ,
otherwise the system is already at fixed points. We construct an update sequence as follows:
1. For any time step t + 1, t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., if there exists some it+1 ∈ V1(t) such that∑
j∈V2(t)wit+1j > 1/2, then update node it+1 at time step t+ 1 and thereby we get V1(t+
1) = V1(t) \ {it+1} and V2(t+ 1) = V2(t) ∪ {it+1};
2. The update stops at time step T if there does not exists any i ∈ V1(T ) such that∑
j∈V2(T )wij > 1/2.
By updating the system along the sequence {i1, . . . , iT} we obtain two sets V1(T ) and V2(T ),
with V1(T ) = V \ V2(T ), and all the individuals in V1(T ) (V2(T ) resp.) hold the opinion 1
(2 resp.). Note that V2(T ) is the cohesive expansion of V2(0). However, since V2(0) is not
necessarily cohesive, V2(T ) is not necessarily cohesive either.
If V1(T ) is empty, then the system is already at a fixed point where all the nodes hold opinion
y2. If V1(T ) is not empty, then, for any i ∈ V1(T ) = V \ V2(T ), since V2(T ) is already the
cohesive expansion of V2(0), we have
∑
j∈V2(T )wij ≤ 1/2, which implies that
∑
j∈V1(T )
wij =
∑
j∈V \V2(T )
wij = 1−
∑
j∈V2(T )
wij ≥ 1/2. (S33)
Therefore, V1(T ) is cohesive. Denote by E1 = V1(T ) ∪ {j1, . . . , jk} the cohesive expan-
sion of V1(T ), and the nodes are added to V1(T ) along the sequence j1, . . . , jk. Now we ob-
tain the update sequence i1, . . . , iT , j1, . . . , jk. If E1 = V , then along the update sequence
i1, . . . , iT , j1, . . . , jk the system reaches the fixed point where all the nodes adopt opinion y1. If
E1 6= V , then along such update sequence the system reaches the state in which all the nodes in
E1 adopt opinion y1 while all the nodes in V \ E1 adopt opinion y2. According to Lemma 3.3,
E1 and V \ E1 are both maximally cohesive sets. Therefore, the system reaches a fixed point
along the update sequence i1, . . . , iT , j1, . . . , jk.
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Now we consider the case of any arbitrary initial condition x0 ∈ Rn. Since each entry of
x0 is sampled independently from the continuous probability distribution fX , almost surely all
the entries of x0 are different from each other. Let the set of the initial individual opinions be
{y1, . . . , yn}, where y1 < . . . < yn. Define two subsets of opinions A1 = {y1} and B1 =
{y2, . . . , yn}.
Due to the weighted-median update rule, whether a node switch from state A1 to B1 only
depends on which neighbors of this node are in state B1. It is irrelevant what opinions in B1
those neighbors hold. Therefore, repeating the argument in the two-opinion case, along some
update sequence i11, . . . , i1k1 , the system reach a state in which the nodes are divided into two
nodes sets E1 and V \E1. All the nodes in E1 hold the opinion y1 and E1 is a maximal cohesive
set. Therefore, after the update sequence i11, . . . , i1k1 , nodes in E1 never switch their opinion
from y1 to the other opinions, while nodes in V \ E1 never switch their opinions to y1.
Let A2 = {y1, y2} and B2 = {y3, . . . , yn}. Since the set of nodes that hold opinion y1 no
longer changes after the update sequence i1,1, . . . , i1,k1 , for all the nodes in V \E1, it makes no
difference to their opinion updates whether the nodes in E1 hold opinion y1 or y2. Therefore,
in the sense of determining the behavior of the nodes in V \ E1, the opinions y1 and y2 can be
considered as the same opinion. As the consequence and following the same line of argument
in the previous paragraph, there exists another update sequence i21, . . . , i2k2 , right after the
sequence i1,1, . . . , i1,k1 , such that, after these two sequences of updates, the nodes are partitioned
into two sets E2 and V \ E2, where E2 is the set of all the nodes that hold either opinion y1 or
opinion y2, and E2 is a maximal cohesive set.
Repeating the argument in the previous paragraph, we obtain the sets E1, . . . , En−1, which
are all maximal cohesive sets, and the entire update sequence
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i1,1, . . . , i1,k1 , . . . , in−1,1, . . . , in−1,kn−1 . Define
V1 = E1; (S34)
Vr = Er \ ∪r−1s=1Es, for any r = 2, . . . , n− 1; (S35)
Vn = V \ ∪n−1s=1Es. (S36)
The way we construct E1 . . . , En−1 implies that, after the update sequence i1,1, . . . , i1,k1 , . . . ,
in−1,1, . . . , in−1,kn−1 , the system reaches a state in which, for any r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, all the nodes
in Vr hold the opinion yr and will not switch to any other opinion. Therefore, the system is at a
fixed point. This concludes the proof of statement 1.
Now we proceed to prove statement 2. If the only maximal cohesive set inG(W ) is V itself,
then according to Lemma 3.2, the cohesive expansion of any cohesive set is V itself. Therefore,
for any initial condition, following the same construction of update sequences in the proof of
statement 1, the system will end up being at a state in which all the nodes hold the same opinion,
i.e., the consensus state. This concludes the proof of statement 2.
Statement 3 is proved by constructing the set X0 of initial conditions as
X0 =
{
x0 ∈ Rn | max
j∈M
x0,j < min
k∈V \M
x0,k, or min
j∈M
x0,j > max
k∈V \M
x0,k
}
. (S37)
Apparently the set X0 has non-zero Lebesgue measure in Rn. Moreover, for any x0 ∈ X0, the
opinions of the nodes in M will always be lower (higher resp.) than the opinion of any node in
V \M if maxj∈M x0,j < mink∈V \M x0,k (minj∈M x0,j > maxk∈V \M resp.). This concludes the
proof of statement 3.
Now we proceed to prove statement 4. According to the definition of indecisive out-links,
if the link (i, j) is an indecisive out-link of node i and node j’s opinion is different from the
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opinion of any other out-neighbor of node i, then node i will not adopt node j’s opinion by the
weighted median update. If the graph Gdecisive(W ) does not have a globally reachable node,
then Gdecisive(W ) has at least two sink subset of nodes, S1 and S2. By sink subset we mean
a subset of node for which there is no out-link connected to any node not in this subset. For
any initial condition x0 generated randomly and independently from a continuous probability
distribution, almost surely all the entries of x0 are different from each other. Therefore, the
nodes in S1 will never adopt the opinion held by the nodes in S2, and the nodes in S2 will never
adopt the opinion held by the nodes in S1 either, that is, there does not exists an update sequence
along which the system reaches consensus.
According to the proof of Theorem 3.6, at the final steady state, a set of all the nodes adopt-
ing the same opinion is not necessarily cohesive. However, for any xˆ such that mini xi(0) ≤
xˆ < maxi xi(0), the set {i |xi(∞) ≤ xˆ} and the set {i |xi(∞) > xˆ} form a cohesive partition
of the influence network.
The conditions for almost-sure consensus and disagreement provided in Theorem 3.6 are re-
lated in the following sense: if the only maximal cohesive set ofG(W ) is V , thenGdecisive(W )
has at least one globally reachable node. As indicated by Theorem 3.6 and discussed in the main
text, the phase transition between consensus and disagreement in the weighed-median model is
not deterministic and thus more sophisticated, compared to DeGroot model and its extensions
reviewed in Section S2, which deterministically predict either consensus or disagreement.
S4 Empirical Validation of Weighted-Median Mechanism
In this section, we compare the prediction accuracies of the weighted-median and weighted-
averaging mechanisms via analysis of empirical data. The dataset we use was published in
the paper by Kerckhove et al. (14) and was collected from a set of online human-subject ex-
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periments. We refer to the original paper (14) and its supplementary information for detailed
descriptions of the dataset and the experiment design. Essentially, every single experiment in-
volves 6 anonymous individuals, who sequentially answer 30 questions within tightly limited
time. The questions are either guessing the proportion of a certain color in a given image (gaug-
ing game), or guessing the number of dots in certain color in a given image (counting game).
Since the participants are given tightly limited time for each question, their answers are mainly
based on subjective guessing. For each question, the 6 participants give their answers for 3
rounds. After each round, they will see the answers of all the 6 participants as feedback and
possibly alter their opinions based on this feedback. The dataset records, for each experiment,
the individuals’ opinions in each round of the 30 questions.
We compare the accuracies of the predictions by different models of the participants’ opin-
ion (i.e., answer) shifts in the next rounds, when confronted with others’ opinions at the current
rounds. To be more specific, for a question in a given experiment, if we denote by xi(t) the
answer given by individual i at round t, then what we aim to compare are the following hy-
potheses:
Hypo. 1 (median): xi(t+ 1) = Median(x(t)); (S38)
Hypo. 2 (average): xi(t+ 1) = Average(x(t)); (S39)
Hypo. 3 (median with inertia): xi(t+ 1) = γi(t)xi(t) + (1− γi(t))Median(x(t)); (S40)
Hypo. 4 (average with inertia): xi(t+ 1) = βi(t)xi(t) + (1− βi(t))Average(x(t)); (S41)
Hypo. 5 (median with prejudice): xi(t+ 1) = γ˜i(t)xi(1) + (1− γ˜i(t))Median(x(t)); (S42)
Hypo. 6 (average with prejudice): xi(t+ 1) = β˜i(t)xi(1) + (1− β˜i(t))Average(x(t)). (S43)
Here, Hypothesis 1 and 2 are parameter-free. Hypothesis 3 and 4 introduce the individuals pa-
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rameters γi(t) and βi(t) to characterize the corresponding opinion updates with inertia. Hypoth-
esis 5 and 6, with the parameters γ˜i(t) and β˜i(t), characterize the effects of individual prejudice,
i..e, the persistent attachment to initial opinions (4). We apply these hypotheses above to predict
individuals’ answers at the (t+ 1)−th round given the participants’ answers at the t−th round,
for t = 1 and 2 respectively. For Hypothesis 1 and 2, since they are parameter-free, we directly
apply them to predict the participants’ answers at the (t + 1)-th round based on their answers
at the t-th round. For Hypothesis 3-6, in practice, for each participant i in a given experiment,
the parameters γi(t), βi(t), γ˜i(t) and β˜i(t) are estimated by least-square linear regression based
on her/his answers in the first 20 questions as the training set. Then these estimated parame-
ters are used to predict the her/his answers in the remaining 10 questions. Therefore, for each
participant in a given experiment, we obtain 30 predictions of the 2nd-round (3rd-round resp.)
answers and 30 observed 2nd-round (3rd-round) answers regarding Hypothesis 1 and 2. For
Hypothesis 3-6, we obtain 10 predictions of the 2nd-round (3rd-round resp.) answers and 10
observed 2nd-round (3rd-round) answers respectively.
Here we present the results on the predictions of the participants’ 2nd-round answers based
on their 1st-round answers. Regarding the opinion shifts from the first round to the second
round, Hypotheses 5 and 6 are equivalent to Hypotheses 3 and 4 respectively. For counting
games, we randomly sample 18 experiments from the dataset, in which 71 participants give
answers to all the 30 questions at each round. For each of these 71 participants, we apply
Hypothesis 1-4 respectively to predict their answers to each question in the 2nd round, based on
the participants’ answers in the 1st round, and then compare the error rates of the predictions.
The error rate is defined as:
error rate =
prediction - observed value
observed value
. (S44)
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The results are presented in Panel A of Fig. S3. For gauging games, we randomly sampled 21
experiments, in which 55 participants answers all the 30 questions at each round. Since the
answers to gauging games are already in percentages, we measure the accuracy by the absolute
values of errors instead of the error rates. The data analysis results are given in Panel B of
Fig. S3. Regarding the predictions of opinion shifts from the 2nd round to the 3rd round, the
data analysis results are provided in Panel C (for counting games) and Panel D (for gauging
games) of Fig. S3 respectively.
As the data analysis results indicate, in any of the three set-ups (parameter-free, inertia,
prejudice), the model with median predicts the opinion shifts with smaller errors than the pre-
dictions by the model with average. Remarkably, as for the parameter-free models, the pre-
dictions by median enjoy significantly smaller median error (rates), mean error rate, and mean
absolute-value error, compared with the predictions by average. For counting games, the pre-
dictions of the 2nd-round (3rd-round resp.) answers by median (i.e., Hypothesis 1) enjoy a
37.35% (46.36% resp.) lower median error rate than the corresponding predictions by average
(i.e., Hypothesis 2). For gauging games, the predictions of the 2nd-round (3rd-round resp.)
answers by median enjoy a 40.00% (50.00% resp.) lower median absolute-value error than the
corresponding predictions by average.
In addition, the parameters γi(t), γ˜i(t), βi(t), β˜i(t) in Hypothesis 3-6 and estimated by
mean-square linear regression are not stable and thereby might not reflect any intrinsic personal
attribute of the participants. We note that some individuals participated in multiple experiments
and their parameters vary significantly among different experiment. For example, the parameter
γi(2) of an individual with anonymous ID 22 in three different experiments are 0.3052, 0.5158,
and 0.976 respectively.
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S5 Numerical Comparisons Between Weighted-Median
Model and Models Based on Weighted Average
In this section we compare by simulations the differences in predictions between the weighted-
median opinion dynamics and some of the extensions of the DeGroot model based on the
weighted-average opinion updates. We focus on the following aspects of model predictions:
(1) the relation between initial opinion distribution and the final steady opinion distribution;
(2) the centrality distributions for opinions with distinct levels of extremeness; (3) the effects
of group size and clustering on the probability of reaching consensus. The simulation results
indicate that the weighted-median model predicts realistic features of opinion dynamics in all of
those aspects, which can not be achieved by the other models without deliberately tuning their
parameters.
S5.1 Set-up of the models in comparison
Before presenting the simulation results, we first specify what models we compare with the
weighted-median opinion dynamics.
DeGroot model with absolutely stubborn agents: Since the assumption of absolute stub-
bornness is often too strong and there is no widely-accepted statistical result on the proportion of
“absolutely stubborn individuals” in real society, we assume that the social system we consider
has 5% absolutely stubborn agents. Given an influence network G(W ) with no absolutely stub-
born individuals, we randomly pick 5% of the individuals and let them be absolutely stubborn,
i.e., for each of the picked individuals, let wii = 1 and wij = 0 for any j 6= i.
Friedkin-Johnsen model: The equation for Friedkin-Johnsen model is given by
x(t+ 1) = AWx(t) + (I − A)x(0), (S45)
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where A = diag(a1, . . . , an). The Friedkin-Johnsen model itself does not specify what the
values of a1, . . . , an are. We assume that each ai is independently randomly generated from the
uniform distribution Unif[0, 1].
The networked bounded-confidence model: The networked bounded-confidence model
on directed and unweighted graphs was proposed in (34). Here we extend the model to directed
and weighted graphs. Given the influence network G(W ) and the individual confidence radii
r1, . . . , rn, the networked bounded-confidence model is given below:
xi(t+ 1) =
∑
j∈Ni: |xj(t)−xi(t)|<ri wijxj(t)∑
j∈Ni: |xj(t)−xi(t)|<ri wij
, (S46)
for any i. In addition, we assume that, if the initial opinions are randomly generated from
the uniform distribution Unif[0, 1], then the individual confidence radii are independently ran-
domly generated from the uniform distribution Unif[0, 0.5]; if the initial opinions are randomly
generated from the uniform distribution Unif[−1, 1], then the individual confidence radii are in-
dependently randomly generated from the uniform distribution Unif[0, 1]. As a result, the most
closed-minded individuals are absolutely stubborn and the most open-minded individuals are
open to any opinion.
Since the Altafini model with negative weights is not based on the same concept of influence
network as the other models mentioned in this article, it is not included in the comparison.
S5.2 Simulation study 1: initial and final opinion distribution
In this numerical study, we compare the final steady opinion distributions predicted by different
models under the same initial condition. We compare the model predictions on both the scale-
free networks and small-world networks. The former are randomly generated according to the
Baraba´si-Albert model (27), while the latter are randomly generated according to the Watts-
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Strogatz small-world model (28). Given a randomly generated network, we add self loops to
all the individuals. Weights are randomly assigned to all the links in the network and normal-
ized such that, for each individual, the weights of their out-links sum up to 1. We consider
five examples of initial opinion distributions: a uniform distribution, a uni-modal and symmet-
ric distribution, an uni-modal and skewed distribution, a bi-modal distribution and a 3-modal
distribution, defined as follows respectively:
1. Regarding the uniform distribution, we let the initial opinion of each individual be in-
dependently randomly sampled from the uniform distribution on [0, 1], i..e, xi(0) ∼
Unif[0, 1] for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n};
2. Regarding the uni-modal distribution, we let the initial opinion of each individual be
independently randomly sampled from the Beta distribution Beta(2, 2);
3. Regarding the skewed distribution, we let the initial opinion of each individual be inde-
pendently randomly sampled from the Beta distribution Beta(2, 7);
4. Regarding the bimodal distribution, each individual i’s initial opinion is independently
generated in the following way: Firstly we generate a random sample Y from the Beta
distribution Beta(2, 10), and then let xi(0) = Y or 1−Y with probability 0.5 respectively;
5. Regarding the 3-modal distribution, each individual i’s initial opinion is independently
generated in the following way: Firstly we generate two random samples Y and Z from
Beta(2, 17) and Beta(12, 12) respectively, and then let xi(0) be Y , 1 − Y , or Z with
probabilities 0.33, 0.33, and 0.34 respectively.
For each initial opinion distribution, we randomly generate the initial opinion of each individual
independently and let the models in comparison start with the same initial condition. When
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each of these models reaches a steady state, or is sufficiently close to a steady state, e.g., when∑n
i=1 (xi(t+ 1)− xi(t))2 < 0.001, their final opinion distributions are computed respectively.
The randomly generated scale-free network is undirected and contains n = 5000 nodes (in-
dividuals). The distribution of individual degrees d is Pr[d] ∼ ad−b, where a = 12620 with
the 95% confidence bound (12270, 12970) and b = −2.333 with the 95% confidence bound
(−2.367,−2.300). Simulation results shown in Fig. S4 indicate that our weighted-median opin-
ion model is the only one that naturally generate various types of steady opinion distributions
empirically observed in real society.
Numerical comparisons conducted on a small-world network, with average degree equal
to 7 and the rewiring probability β = 0.2, indicates the same conclusion as on the scale-free
network. See Fig. S5.
S5.3 Simulation study 2: centrality distribution for opinions with differ-
ent levels of extremeness
We investigate the centrality distributions of opinions with different levels of extremeness pre-
dicted by all the models in comparison. Let the individual initial opinions be randomly gener-
ated from the uniform distribution Unif [−1, 1] and classify the opinions into four categories:
the moderate opinions correspond to those in the interval [−0.25, 0.25]; the biased opinions
correspond to those in [−0.5,−0.25) ∪ (0.25, 0.5]; the radical opinions correspond to those in
[−0.75,−0.5)∪ (0.5, 0.75]; the extreme opinions correspond to those in [−1,−0.75)∪ (0.75, 1].
For the simulation presented in Fig. 3A in the main text, we construct 1000 realizations
of the weighted-median opinion dynamics on the same scale-free network with 1500 nodes.
The scale-free network is randomly generated according to the Baraba´si-Albert model (27),
with the degree distribution Pr[d] ∼ ad−b, where a = 3866 with the 95% confidence bound
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(3633, 4098) and b = −2.356 with the 95% confidence bound (−2.429,−2.283). Each re-
alization starts with a different randomly generated initial condition. For each individual, we
compute the frequency of finally adopting an extreme opinion over the 1000 independent real-
izations.
For the simulation results presented in Fig. 3B in the main text, we construct a scale-free
network with 2000 nodes and run 1000 independent simulations of the weighted-median opin-
ion dynamics. The initial opinions are randomly generated from the uniform distribution on
the interval [−1, 1]. For the final steady state in each simulation, we compute the extremists
focus, defined as the ratio of neighors adopting extreme opinions, and the indegree centrality
for each individual. Then we plot the 2-dimension distributions over the extremists focus and
the indegree for the extremists and the entire population respectively.
Here we further simulated the Friedkin-Johnsen model and the DeGroot model with abso-
lutely stubborn agents on the same scale-free network as in last paragraph. The reason why the
networked bounded-confidence model is not included in this comparative numerical study is
that the convergence time of the networked bounded-confidence model is too long for simula-
tions on networks with 2000 nodes. We simulated the Friedkin-Johnsen model and the DeGroot
model with absolutely stubborn agents on the same scale-free network as in last paragraph. For
the Friedkin-Johnsen model, before each simulation, the model parameters, i.e., the individu-
als’ attachments to initial opinions, are ramdomly generated from the uniform distribution on
[0, 1]. For the DeGroot model with absolutely stubborn agents, before each simulation, each
individual has a 0.05 probability of being set to be absolutely stubborn. The two-dimension
distributions for the final opinions over the extremists focus and the indegree centrality, of the
weighted-median model, the Friedkin-Johnsen model, and the DeGroot model with absolutely
stubborn agents are presented in Fig. S6.
The results presented in Fig. 3D in the main text is contained in Fig. S7, where we consider
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four types of centrality measure for the individuals in the influence network: the in-degree cen-
trality, the closeness centrality, the betweenness centrality, and the eigenvector centrality. Here
the in-degree centrality is defined as the sum of the weights of all the incoming links, including
the self loop. We construct the simulations on scale-free networks with 1000 nodes and with the
average degree equal to 4. The reason why we do not use small-world networks is that, the cen-
trality distribution for small-world networks is not as heavy-tailed as scale-free networks, i.e., in
small-world networks there are not enough individuals with very high centrality. We construct
500 realizations of different opinion dynamics models in comparison. For each realization we
randomly generate a scale-free network with n = 1000 nodes and randomly generate the initial
opinions from the uniform distribution Unif [−1, 1]. Then we run different models and obtain
their corresponding predicted final opinions. The probability density functions of individual
centrality for the final opinion holders with different levels of extremeness are estimated based
on the obtained data.
Simulation results shown in Fig. S7 indicate that, in the weighted-median model, the cen-
trality distributions of different types of opinions are clearly separated, and, compared to the
centrality distribution of the total population, the extreme opinions tend to concentrate more
on the low-centrality nodes. Such features hold in the weighted-median model for in-degree,
closeness, and betweenness centralities, and are not observed in any of the other models.
Note that, according to the weighted-median mechanism, an individual is absolutely stub-
born as long as their self weight is no less than 1/2, that is, this individual thinks that he or she
is more important than all the other individuals together. Based on this observation, one might
argue that, in the weighted-median model, individuals with fewer social neighbors are more
vulnerable to extreme opinions just because they have higher likelihoods of being assigned no
less than 1/2 self weights, when the link weights of the influence network are randomly gener-
ated, and as the consequence, they can never get rid of their initial opinions if they are extreme.
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In order to rule out such an effect of link-weight randomization, simulations with the same
set-up as described in this subsection are done on a scale-free network with no self loop. The
simulation results indicate that the same features presented in the previous paragraph are still
preserved. See Fig. S8. Therefore, the tendency that relatively peripheral nodes in the influ-
ence network are more vulnerable to extreme opinions is not merely an effect of link-weight
randomization, but due to some more profound effects related to both network structure and
microscopic mechanism.
S5.4 Simulation study 3: effects of group size and clustering on the prob-
ability of reaching consensus
In this subsection, we investigate the effects of group size and network clustering on the prob-
ability of reaching consensus. This numerical study is motivated by the everyday experience
that it is usually more difficult for a large group, or a group containing many clusters, to reach
consensus in discussions. Such phenomena is prominent but not predicted by any of the ex-
tensions of the DeGroot model: As reviewed in Section 2, the DeGroot model itself always
predicts consensus if the influence network satisfies some mild connectivity conditions. On
the contrary, the DeGroot model with absolutely stubborn individuals predicts persistent dis-
agreement whenever there are more than one absolutely stubborn individual holding different
initial opinions. Similarly, the Friedkin-Johnsen model predicts persistent disagreement when-
ever there are more than one individuals with non-zero attachment to distinct initial opinions.
Therefore, those models mentioned above are not eligible for comparison regarding the proba-
bility of reaching consensus. The only model we compare with the weighted-median model is
the networked bounded-confidence model, see Section 4.1, which has barely been understood
in previous literature.
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For the numerical study presented in Fig. 4 in the main text, we simulate different models
on Watts-Strogatz small-world networks (28). This generative model has three parameters: the
network size n, the individual degree d, and the rewiring probability β of individuals’ out-links.
When we investigate the effect of group size, we can fix the parameters d and β so that the
network size changes without significantly changing the local structure of the network; When
we investigate the effect of clustering, we can fix n, d and change the parameter β ∈ [0, 1].
According to the Watts-Strogatz model, the smaller β, the more clustered the network is. For
the simulations presented in Fig. 4A and 4B in the main text, we fix the rewiring probability as
β = 1 and randomly generate small-world networks with different sizes and average degrees.
For each pair of network size and average degree, we construct 5000 realizations. For each
realization, different models start with the same initial condition that is independently randomly
generated from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. For each model we compute the frequency of
finally achieving consensus over the 5000 realizations. For the simulations presented in Fig. 4C
and 4D in the main text, we fix the network size as n = 30 and n = 60 respectively, and
construct small-world networks with different rewiring probabilities β and average degrees, as
shown in the figures. For each pair of β and average degree, we construct 5000 realizations of
the weighted-median opinion dynamics (Fig. 4C in the main text) or the networked bounded-
confidence model (Fig. 4D in the main text). Each realization starts with a different initial
condition randomly sampled from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. For each setting of the
model, the rewiring probability, and the average degree, we compute the frequency of finally
achieving consensus over the 5000 realizations.
The simulation results provided in Fig. 4 in the main text indicate that both the weighted-
median model and the networked bounded-confidence model have the feature that the consensus
probability decreases as the network size or the clustering coefficient increases. In addition, as
shown by Fig. 4B in the main text, the networked bounded-confidence model predicts too low
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consensus probability even for small-size and dense networks.
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Fig. S1: Longitudinal data of the distribution of European people’s attitudes, in the years
of 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016, towards the following statement: “Country’s cultural life is
undermined by immigrants”. In the opinion spectrum, 0 stands for strongly agree, while 10
represents strongly disagree.
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Fig. S2: Examples of cohesive sets and decisive/indecisive links in influence networks. In
Panel A, for each node, the weights of their out-links (including the self loop) sum up to 1 and
the self loops, whose weights can be inferred, are omitted to avoid clutter. The set of blue nodes
in Panel A is a cohesive set but not maximally cohesive. The sets of blue and red nodes is a
maximal cohesive set. In Panel B, the links 1 → 3, 1 → 4 and 1 → 5 are decisive, whereas
1→ 2 is indecisive.
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Fig. S3: Empirical analysis results for the dataset collected in an online human-subject
experiment (14). Here Hypothesis 1-6 correspond to median, average, median with inertia,
average with inertia, median with prejudice, and average with prejudice, respectively, as defined
in Section S4. The acronym “MAE” in these tables is short for “mean absolute-value error” and
“MER” is short for “mean error rate”.
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Acronyms: WM = the weighted-median model; DS = the DeGroot model with absolutely stubborn agents; F-J = the Friedkin-Johnsen model; NBC = the networked bounded-confidence model. 
Fig. S4: Distributions of the initial opinions and the final opinions predicted by different
models. The simulations are run on the same scale-free network (27) with 5000 nodes.
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Acronyms: WM = the weighted-median model; DS = the DeGroot model with absolutely stubborn agents; F-J = the Friedkin-Johnsen model; NBC = the networked bounded-confidence model. 
Fig. S5: Distributions of the initial opinions and the final opinions predicted by different
models. The simulations are run on the same small-world network with 5000 nodes.
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Fig. S6: Comparisons among the weighted-median model, the Friedkin-Johnsen model,
and the DeGroot model with absolutely stubborn agents, on their predictions of the two-
dimension distributions of the final opinions, over the extremists focus and the indegree
centrality. Panel A is Fig. 5 in a previous paper (17), licensed under Creative Commons CC0
public domain dedication (CC0 1.0). This figure plots the empirical distribution of randomly
sampled Twitter users over in-degree and the ISIS focus (the ratio of social neighbors who
support the ISIS terrorists). Panel B-D are the three aforementioned models’ predictions re-
spectively. Among these three models, only the two-dimension distribution predicted by the
weighted-median model resembles the real data in Panel A.
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Acronyms: WM = the weighted-median model; DS = the DeGroot model with absolutely stubborn agents; 
      F-J = the Friedkin-Johnsen model; NBC = the networked bounded-confidence model. 
Fig. S7: Centrality distributions for moderate, biased, radical and extreme final opin-
ions predicted by different models. The distributions are presented in the form of log prob-
ability density. Here the initial opinions be randomly generated from the uniform distribution
Unif [−1, 1] and classify the opinions into four categories: the moderate opinions correspond to
those in the interval [−0.25, 0.25]; the biased opinions correspond to those in [−0.5,−0.25) ∪
(0.25, 0.5]; the radical opinions correspond to those in [−0.75,−0.5) ∪ (0.5, 0.75]; the extreme
opinions correspond to those in [−1,−0.75) ∪ (0.75, 1].
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Fig. S8: Centrality distributions for moderate, biased, radical and extreme final opinions
predicted by the weighted-median model, on a scale-free network with no self loop. The
distributions are presented in the form of log probability density. The opinion spectrum is given
by Panel A. Panels B-D show the log probability distributions in terms of different measures of
centrality.
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